.UMBIA COLLEGE 
DEPARTMENT OF * ' TT LOSOPHY AND EDUCATION 



SYLLABUS OF PHILOSOPHY I 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



JAMES H. HYSLOP, Ph.D. 

Instructor in Philosophy in Columbia College 



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New York 

January, 1895 

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COLUMBIA COLLEGE . 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION 



SYLLABUS OF PHILOSOPHY I 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



JAMES H'FlIYSLOP, Ph.D. 

Instructor in Philosophy in Columbia College 



COLUMBIA COLLEGE 

New York 

January, 1895 

Price $1.00 






Copyright, 1895 

BY 
JAMES H. HYSLOP 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAPTER 


I. 


Introduction . 


PAGE 

7 


CHAPTER 


II. 


The Conditions of Conscious- 








ness 


13 


CHAPTER 


I'll. 


Sensation 


21 


CHAPTER 


IV. 


The Special Senses 


29 


CHAPTER 


V. 


Consciousness and Attention. 


4i 


CHAPTER 


VI. 


Apprehension or Intuition . 


53 


CHAPTER 


VII. 


Memory 


67 


CHAPTER 


VIII. 


Thought or Ideation . 


83 


CHAPTER 


IX. 


Emotion 


104 


CHAPTER 


X. 


The Will or Conation 
(Hi) 


112 



ABBREVIATIONS 



J. Br. C. = James' (Prof. Willam) Psychology, Briefer Course. (New York : 

Henry Holt & Co., 1892.) 
James, Psy. = James' (Prof. William) Psychology, Larger Course. (New York : 

Henry Holt & Co., 1890.) 
B. Ele. = Baldwin's (Prof. J. Mark) Elements of Psychology. (New York : Henry 

Holt & Co., 1893.) 
D. Psy. = Dewey's (Prof. John) Psychology. (New York : Harper & Brothers, 

1887.) 
H. Out. = H6ffding's (Prof. H.) Outlines of Psychology. (New York: Macmil- 

lan&Co., 1 89 1.) 
Ladd, Out. = Ladd's (Prof. G. T.) Outlines of Physiological Psychology. (New 

York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891.) 
Ladd, Psy. = Ladd's (Prof. G. T.) Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory. 

(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894.) 
Sully, H. M. = Sully's (Prof. J.) The Human Mind. (New York : D. Apple- 
ton & Co., 1893.) 
Hamilton, Lects. on Meta. = Hamilton's (Sir "William) Lectures on Metaphysics. 

(Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1859.) 
(iv) 



PREFACE 



The present Syllabus has been designed solely as a time- 
saving instrument in my lectures on the subject, and as a 
guide to my students in their reading and study. The 
definitions and outline have been made very full and com- 
plete, and the important topics mentioned in the order in 
which it is best to discuss them. The Syllabus will not 
supply the place of a text-book, but it will facilitate the use 
of the most important of existing works, especially for those 
who are beginners, and who require a systematic analysis 
and plan of suggestions for their reading. It is shaped also 
so that certain topics of the philosophic sort can be omitted, 
if desired. The writer's hope is that others may find the 
Syllabus as useful as he has found it necessary, and it has 
been composed with that contingency in view. 

The references are by no means exhaustive, but have 
been made full enough for diversified reading and study. 
The main object has been to mention only the current and 
most important English works on the subject of Psychology. 
Others who choose to use the Syllabus may add to the re- 
ferences as their own pleasure may dictate. 

James H. Hyslop 

(v) 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



CHAPTKR I 

INTRODUCTION 

I. Definition. Etymological definition = science of the 
soul. Greek ^vxv, soul, and Uyog, discourse. (For history 
of the term see Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Lecture 
VIII.) Metaphysical implications of this definition=science 
of a spiritual as opposed to a material subject. Similar de- 
finitions that are not etymological are " Science of the Ego," 
"science of the mind," "science of the mental subject," etc. 
All of these make it an inquiry into the existence of mind 
rather than the laws of mental action. 

Scientific definition =■= science of the phenomena of con- 
sciousness. No metaphysical questions are necessarily in- 
volved in this conception. It treats psychology in the same 
manner as other sciences, and makes it an inquiry into the 
nature, dependence, conditions and laws of conscious states, 
in contrast with events that are not conscious. No ques- 
tions are begged by it. It makes psychology the science of 
the subject's modes, whether it be spiritual or not. Observe, 
however, that the term "science" has different meanings in 
the two cases. 

References. J. Br. C, p. i; B. Ele., p. i; D. Psy., Chap. I.; H. Outlines, 
Chap. I.; Ladd. Psy., Chap. I.; Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I., Chap. I.; Hamilton, 
Lects. on Meta., Lect. VIII. 

(7) 



8 S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

§ (i) Psychology as a Science. Meaning of the term 
"science." Broader conception = systematic knowledge. 
This applies to any form of inquiry, metaphysical or scientific. 
Narrower conception = investigation of the conditions and 
laws of events. This excludes metaphysical inquiries. In 
the former meaning, psychology is a branch of the philo- 
sophic " sciences," in the latter a branch of the empirical or 
phenomenological " sciences." 

i. Psychology as a "Natural" Science. Meaning of " nat- 
ural " science. History of the term. Current contrasts sug- 
gested by the term are " natural and supernatural;" "nat- 
ural and unnatural;" "natural and moral," etc. Associated 
with the physical, on the one hand, and with the fixed and 
uniform, on the other, whether physical or not. 

2. Psychology as a "Metaphysical" Science. Its function 
in this is to inquire whether there is an Ego or soul other 
than mere brain action to account for the phenomena of con- 
sciousness. Contrasts with the " natural " only as the psych- 
ical with the physical. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 1-7; Philosophic Review, Vol. I., pp. 24-53, 147- 
153. 

§ (2) Data of Psychology. The phenomena of con- 
sciousness, mental events, such as sensations, perceptions, 
association, reasoning, feeling, desire, choice, volition. 

t. General Conception of Consciousness. Consciousness 
in general = knowledge, or awareness of facts ; in particular, 
it = the unity of all other mental states. (Hamilton, "the 
complement of the cognitive energies.") The complement 
or concomitant of all mental action, and its essential charac- 
teristic. ' Sometimes it is hardly distinguished from self-con- 
sciousness. Always denotes the psychical or mental as op- 
posed to the physical or mechanical. 

References. J. Br. C. p. 2; B. Ele., p. 2; D. Psy., p. 2; H. Out., pp. 11-12; 
Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 7-9. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY g 

2. Consciousness and Physical Phenomena Compared. 
Usually contrasted, the one mental, the other mechanical. 

(a) Consciousness not known as a mode of motion; phy- 
sical phenomena are. 

(b) Consciousness is incommensurable in any definite 
terms. Compare the principles of measurement, involving 
units of time and space. 

(c) Consciousness represents the subject as aware of 
itself and its states ; physical events are of subjects which 
are not aware of their actions. Consciousness knows, phys- 
ical events merely occur. 

(d) Consciousness or mental events are subjective, physi- 
cal events are objective. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 2-4; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 4-9. 

§ (3) Relation of Psychology to Other Sciences. 
Physiology, Ontology or Metaphysics, and Epistemology. 

1. Physiology = Science of the structure and functions of 
the body, the physical organism and conditions of conscious- 
ness. Science of the bodily phenomena of which we are not 
immediately conscious. 

2. Ontology = Science of the nature of reality, and an ex- 
istence other than mere phenomena. Science of the nature 
of subject and object. This concerns the ultimate nature of 
mind and the world. Theories of the nature of existence. 

3. Epistemology = Theory of knowledge = science of the 
processes of general knowledge, of the relation between sub- 
ject and object, or of the way in which we become aware of 
external reality, or of existence other than our own mental 
states. 

4. Psychology = Science of the laws and conditions of 
mental phenomena, science of events of which we are im- 
mediately conscious. Two forms : 

(#) Empirical Psychology = observation, classification and 



IO 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCH OLOGY 



explanation of mental phenomena, according to their order 
of occurrence. Analysis of their contents and investiga- 
tion of their relations to each other. The properly " scientific " 
aspect of the subject. 

{b) Rational psychology = metaphysical aspect of the sub- 
ject. Science of the ultimate cause or ground of mental 
phenomena. 

II. Method of Psychology. Dispute in regard to psy- 
chological method, partly from the reaction against mediaeval 
thought and partly from the tendency to make psychology 
a physical, or at least an exact science. Hence there are 
two methods defended, which may be combined in the 
correct view of the subject. 

§ (i) Introspection, or the Subjective Method. This 
is self-analysis, reflection upon one's own states, the exami- 
nation by consciousness of its own phenomena. In it con- 
sciousness is both the instrument and the object of inquiry. 
Two forms : reflection on sensations, and reflection on intel- 
lectual states, emotions and volitions. Meaning of reflection. 
Limits and defects of introspection. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 6 and 13; D. Psy., pp. 6-7; H. Out., pp. 16-24; 
Ladd, Psy., pp. 16-22; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 15-18; Bowne, Int. to Psy. 
Theory, pp. 2-3. 

§(2) Extrospection, or the Objective Method. This 
is the external observation of other minds, or of external 
phenomena which reflect the existence of consciousness in 
various forms. The consciousness of others must be inter- 
preted by their actions. There are several fields for its 
application. 

1. ADULT PSYCHOLOGY. Observation of mature intelli- 
gence. Analysis of complex ideas already formed. Study 
of actions, habits and manners. 

2. Infant Psychology. Observation of nascent intelli- 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOG Y Y ! 

gence, of complex ideas in the making, Its value lies in the 
discovery of the elementary constituents of thought. 

3. Animal Psychology. Observation of animal intelli- 
gence. Mainly a study of instincts and intelligence more 
elementary than in man. 

4. Race PSYCHOLOGY, Observation and interpretation 
of the various races, their institutions, religion, art, laws and 
customs, which reflect certain forms of consciousness. 

5. Abnormal Psychology. Observation of mental 
aberration, such as insanity, deliria, idiocy, hallucinations, 
and unusual phenomena, such as hypnotism, somnambulism, 
dreams, illusions, etc. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 8-10; H. Out., pp. 16-27; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., Chap. 
II.; Ladd, Psy., pp. 21-22. 

§ (3) Experiment. This is the artificial production and 
repetition of phenomena for the purpose of more careful ob- 
servation and analysis. It is mainly objective in its character, 
though capable of limited sicbjective application. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 15-18; H. Out., pp. 21-23; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., 
pp. 22, 30-32; Ladd, Psy., pp. 22-24. 

III. Divisions. These comprise the general classes of 
mental phenomena, with their subdivisions. 

1st. Intellection or Intellect = Processes of knowl- 
edge. Sensation, Perception, Memory, Reasoning, etc. 

2d. EMOTION OR FEELING = Processes of sensibility or 
excitement incident to exercise of function. Pleasure, Pain, 
Passion, Desire, etc. 

3d. CONATION OR Will. Processes of action, or the de- 
termination of events. Impulse, Instinct, Choice, Volition, etc. 

Summary : 



12 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



Intellection. 



Emotion. 



. r 

i 

Conation. -{ 



(Sensation. 
Perception. 
Apperception. 

f Retention. 
Conservation 



(Memory.) 



■I Reproduction or Association. 



v Recognition. 

{Conception. 
Judgment. 
Reasoning. 
Reflexive == Pleasure and Pain. 
Impulsive = Passions or Desires. 
Impulse. 
Instinct. 
Choice. 



Irrational 



Rational < 

(■ Volition. 



CHAPTER II 
THE CONDITIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 

I. Structure of the Nervous System. Distinction be- 
tween neurally and non-neurally organized beings. The 
latter simpler and of low organization, and the former more 
complex and of higher organization. General nature of ner- 
vous system: consists of centers and communicating fibres. 
§ ( i ) Nerve Elements. Characteristic of centers and 
connecting lines. 
i. FIBRES = Connections between the centers and 

periphery. Sensory and Motor. 
2. CELLS = Ganglia for the reception and distribution 
of impressions and movements : consist of gray 
masses of matter. 

(a) Central = Cerebro- spinal mass. 

(b) Peripheral = Cells at the external termini of 
the nerves. 

(c) Intermediate = Ganglia along the lines of the 
nerves. 

§ (2) General Divisions. Divisions according to 
functions. 
1. ENCEPHALOW. The total mass of brain matter 
within the cranium. Subdivisions. 

(a) Cerebrum. = Anterior and upper part of the 
brain. Function, sensory and motor. 

(b) Cerebellum = Posterior and lower portion of 

(13) 



14 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

the brain. Function, co-ordination of move- 
ments. 

(V) Medulla Oblongata = Upper enlargement and 
terminus of the spinal cord. Function, center 
of certain vital and reflex actions. 

(d) Pons Varolii = Mass of fibres connecting the 
cerebrum and cerebellum with the spinal cord. 
Function, communication. 
Minor organs in the cerebrum are the optic 
thalami, corpora striata, and corpora quadra- 
gemina. 

2. Spinal Cord = Mass of neural matter and fibres 
extending throughout the vertebral column. 
Function, organ of the reflex actions. 

(a) Gray Matter = Internal part of the structure. 

(b) While Matter = External part of the structure. 

3. Sympathetic System = The unincased fibres and 
ganglia in front of the vertebral column. Func- 
tion, co-ordination of the vital activities. 

4. CONDUCTING SYSTEM = The neural lines connect- 
ing the centers with the periphery, or various 
centers with each other. 

(a) Sensory Nerves = Receiving Apparatus. Affer- 
ent or Centripetal Nerves. Function, recep- 
tion and communication of stimuli or impres- 
sions. 

(b) Motor Nerves = Reacting Apparatus. Efferent 
or Centrifugal Nerves. Function, the media- 
tion of motor reactions, or movements, initiated 
by the main centers. 

(c) Commissural Fibres = Neural fibres, called 
Associative Tracts, connecting various ence- 
phalic centers with each other. Function, 
the synthesis of different activities. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



15 



References. B. Ele.j pp. 19-32; J. Br. C, pp. 78-90; H., Out., pp. 37-40; 
Herbert Spencer, Psychology, Vol. I., pp. 3-46; Ladd, Out., Chaps. I. and II., 
pp. 1 1-73; Encyc. Brit., Art. Anatomy; Martin, Physiology, pp. 154-200; 
McKendrick and Snodgrass, Physiology of the Senses, pp. 2-30. 

II. Functions. We here regard the functions without 
reference to their locality or form. Experience and devel- 
opment have largely determined specific and local functions. 
§ ( 1 ) GENERAL FORMS. These are those peculiar activi- 
ties which precede and condition the specific and 
adjusted motor reactions. 

1 . Irritability = Reaction of non-neurally organized 
beings, supposed to be due to undifferentiated 
nervous matter, held in solution or unconcentrated. 

2. NEURILITY = Conduction in neurally organized 
beings, performed by the conducting system, and 
is not distributed to other elements of the organ- 
ism, except through the main centers and the 
motor system. 

3. Adaptivity (B. Sentience) = Adjustment of 
neural organisms to complex conditions. Anal- 
ogous to sentient functions. Three elements or 
stages of it. 

(a) Integration=Fnnctlomd and structural changes 
to suit complex environment, differentiation 
and habit. Analogous to sensation. 

(b) Retention = Preservation of former effects of 
stimulus so as to facilitate future actions in the 
same direction. Analogous to memory. 

(c) Selection = Preferential attraction toward cer- 
tain stimuli rather than others. Analogous to 
choice. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 32-39; id. Handbook of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 
18-28; Ladd, Out., pp. 127-128. Implications of Spencer's general law of adap- 
tation will suggest these functions; see Spencer, Biology, Vol. I., Part II., Chap. 
V., and Part III., Chaps. XI and XII. 



x6 syllabus of psychology 

§(2) Forms of Neuro Mental Action. These con- 
sist of both psychological and physiological actions, 
involving conscious states and unconscious activities. 

1. PSYCHOLOGICAL States = Consciousness and its 
subordinate groups of phenomena. 

(a) Sensations, etc. 

(b) Emotions. 

(c) Conative states. 

2. Physiological Actions. These are the motor 
phenomena of the organism, and may be con- 
sciously or unconsciously initiated. They are of 
two kinds, positive and negative. 

(a) Automatic Actions = Spontaneous motor move- 
ments. Illustrations, twitching, nervousness. 
Positive and unconscious. 

(b) Reflex Actions = Stimulated reactions, re- 
sponses to stimulus. Illustrations, heart-beat- 
ing, deglutition, peristaltic movements of the 
stomach and intestines, knee-jerk, and certain 
forms of winking, breathing, etc. Positive 
and unconscious. 

(c) Voluntary Actions = Cogno-initiative move- 
ments, consciously and intentionally deter- 
mined. Illustrations, the common actions of 
life showing intelligent adjustment. Positive 
and conscious. 

(d) Inhibitive ^4^z0;w=Resistance of one center or 
mode of consciousness upon another. The 
first is physiological, the second psychological. 
Negative and unconscious. 

References. B. Ele., p. 39-43; H. Out., pp. 37-44; J. Br. C, pp. 91-101; 
Ladd, Out., pp. 135-143; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 44-46; Vol. II., pp. 181-184. 

III. Localization of Brain Functions. This is the de- 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY ij 

termination of the question, how far mental and motor ac- 
tions are connected with specific localities in the nervous 
system, as well as the general question as to the connection of 
consciousness with the nervous system, as at least its organ. 
Origin of the problem : (a) Phrenology, (b) Pathology, 
(c) Materialism, (d) Certain normal psychological facts. 
§ (i) General Evidence that Consciousness is 
Connected with the Nervous System in a 
SPECIAL WAY. Ancient theories of the localiza- 
tion of consciousness varied, some putting it in the 
heart, some in the brain, and some not localizing it 
at all. The following facts point to the brain : 

1 . Local feelings after mental exertion or excitement. 

2. Disturbances in consciousness due to disease or 
accident to the brain. 

3. Pathological lesions and imperfections observed in 
cases of insanity and idiocy. 

4. Secretions of neural elements (alkaline phosphates) 
after great intellectual exertion. 

5. The relation between the amount of brain and the 
degree of intelligence. There are two limitations 
to this argument. 

{a) It is not the absolute, but the relative quantity 
of brain matter that affects intelligence. 

(b) The relation seems to be between the quantity 
of gray matter, or the form and number of its 
convolutions, and intelligence. 

6. The simultaneous effects of narcotics upon the 
brain and consciousness. 

7. The evidence of direct experiment on the brain 
and nervous system. 

8. Comparison of the different orders of animal ex- 
istence and the relative amount of intelligence 
with the degree of nervous organization. 



!8 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

References. Bain, Senses and Intellect, Chapter II. (Third Edition) ; Ladd, 
Out., pp. 179-195; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp 48-50. 

§(2) Localization of Specific Functions. Besides 
a general connection with the nervous system, the 
forms of consciousness and motor activity seem to 
center in specific localities. 
1. General Conclusions of Physiology. These 
represent only such as a substantial unanimity of 
opinion supports. The distinction is drawn be- 
tween higher and lower centers, which repre- 
sents the distinction between apparently mechani- 
cal and intelligent actions. 

(a) The lower centers (spinal cord, medulla ob- 
longata and the sympathetic system) are the 
seats of reflex and automatic actions. 

(b) The higher centers (cerebrum and cerebellum) 
are the seats of the sensory and intellectual 
functions and of the "voluntary actions as well 
as the emotions. 

(c) The voluntary motor functions are located 
about the fissure of Rolando in both hemi- 
spheres. 

(d) Sensory functions are located behind and be- 
low the motor area. Vision in the occipital 
lobe; taste, smell and hearing in the temporo- 
sphenoidal lobe. 

(e) Intellectual functions are probably located in 
the frontal lobes. 

(/) The co-ordination of motor functions probably 
originates in the cerebellum. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 91-119; James, Psy., Vol. I., Chap. II., pp. 12-80; 
B. Ele., pp. 44-51; H. Out., pp. 29-44; Ladd, Out., Chaps. VIII. and IX., pp. 
177-227; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 47-58; McKindrick and Snodgrass, Physi- 
ology of the Senses, pp. 285-297. 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



19 



2. Special Evidence of Localization. Certain 
specific facts point very strongly to definite locali- 
zation of particular functions. 

(a) Motor aphasia and its location in Broca's con- 
volution. 

(b) Sensory aphasia and its location in Wernicke's, 
convolution. 

(c) Epilepsy, its aura, and cure by trephining. 

(d) Paralysis and the effect on the opposite hemi- 
sphere. 

(e) The effect of lesion in the occipital lobes on 
vision : produces blindness. 

(f) The distinction between sensory and mental 
blindness. 

References. Same as above. 

3. Limitations of the Theory of Localization. 
Certain facts show that the localization of con- 
sciousness and special functions can be accepted 
only under certain limitations, which indicate that 
the localization is empirical rather than organic, 
(a) The difference between the higher and lower 

forms of organization. Lower animals show 
a greater power of recovery from extirpation 
than man. 
(#) Restitution of function without a restitution of 
organ in certain cases of extirpation. This is 
the vicarious influence of other centers. 

(c) Cases where large destruction of brain tissue 
left the intellectual functions unimpaired. 
Compare paralysis, crow-bar case, etc. 

(d) Cases where extirpation of higher centres did 
not seem to impair intelligent action. 

(<?) Limitations of the argument from quantity 
and form of the brain. 



20 S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

References. B. Ele., pp. 48-49; J. Br. C, pp. 11 8-1 19; James, Psy., Vol. I., 
pp. 65-80; Ladd, Out., pp. 222-227 and 192-195. 

§(3) General Laws of Nervous Action. There are 
two laws affecting the functions of the brain, one 
tending in the direction of specialization of func- 
tion, and the other in the direction of generaliza- 
tion of it. They are : — 

1. The Law of Habit. This law is the tendency of 
a center to assume a function as an organic part of 
its purpose, owing to experience and habit It 
becomes really or apparently organic through 
heredity. Hence the fixity of the higher func • 
tions in complex organisms and man, so that they 
are less able to resist the shock of experiments 
involving the extirpation of certain centers. The 
law of habit is the law of action along the lines of 
least resistance until selection and heredity make 
it organic. The law tends to specific localization 
of functions. 

2. The Law of Accommodation. This law is the 
tendency of any center to adjust itself to condi- 
tions, to assume the function of extirpated or 
injured portions. It has limitations, but in less 
organized beings extends so far at times that the 
lower centers may perform the functions usually 
attributed to the higher. (James, Psychology, 
Vol. I., p. 74.) The law tends to show that spe- 
cific localization is empirical and not in its ultimate 
nature organic. 

References. B. Ele., p. 51. See also the general doctrine of evolution as main- 
tained by Spencer, in which these two laws are corollaries of the laws of differen- 
tiation and of the homogeneous. 



OHAPTER III 
THE INTELLECT 

SENSATION 

I. General Nature. Meaning of the term. (Latin 
sentio, to feel or to perceive) Primary and elementary 
event in mental life. Only one element in the total com- 
plex of consciousness involving sensory feeling, emotion, 
attention, etc. Hence the term is abstract, and denotes but 
one aspect of a complex whole. Derivatives sensible, sensu- 
ous, sensitive, sensibility, sensational, sensorial, sensory, and 
their meaning. 

§ ( i ) Definition. Sensations are those states of con- 
sciousness which are produced on the sensorium 
by peripheral stimulus, or by the exercise of or- 
ganic functions. Criticism of common definitions : 
"Reflex of stimulus," "Reaction of the organism 
against impressions," " The affections of the body," 
etc. Relation to complex ideas and higher knowl- 
edge : {a) condition of knowledge, (b) element of 
knowledge. 
§ (2) Conditions of Sensation. The organism or 
sensorium = the sensory nerves, and stimulus. 
1. Extra-organic Stimulus. External. General 
= mechanical pressure and electricity and sudden 
jars. Special = Contact for touch and taste, and 
smell in most cases at least, aerial vibrations for 
sound, and aetherial vibrations for vision. 
(21) 



22 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

2. INTRA-ORGANIC Stimulus. Internal. Excite- 
ment of the peripheral organ and conduction of 
impressions to the nerve centers. 

3. Reaction Time. The lapse of an appreciable 
time between stimulus and the occurrence of sen- 
sation. Exceptions. 

§ (3) Factors or Characteristics of Sensation. 
These are the elements or properties which make 
up a sensation and determine its nature and 
amount. There are two classes : 

1. Quality = Elements determining the nature or 
kind of sensation. 

(a) Relation to stimulus. 

{b) Cognitive accompaniment. 

(c) Emotional tone. 

2. Quantity = Elements determining the amount of 
sensation. 

(a) Intensity, or Degree. Degree of sharpness or 
perceptibility existing in a certain ratio to 
stimulus. Tone Quantity. 

(J?) Extensity, or Volume. Voluminousness or 
massiveness affected by the amount of sensor- 
ial distribution. Space Quantity. 

(c) Protensity, or Duration. Continuance beyond 
the period of the stimulus. Perdurability. 
Time Quantity. 

References. B. Ele., p. 83-85; J. Br. C, pp. 9-16; D. Psy., pp. 27-44; H. 
Out, pp. 101-121; Lackl, Out., pp. 228-236; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 80-98; 
Ladd, Psy., Chapters VI. and VII., pp. 89-140; James, Psy., Vol. II., pp. 1-44. 
Taine, On Intelligence, Vol. I., pp. 100-107. 

§ (4) Forms of Sensation. Sensations may be classed 
according to their mode of origin and the defmite- 
ness or indefiniteness with which they are localized 
at the point of stimulus. The line of distinction, 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 23 

however, is not always definite, since the two gen- 
eral kinds run into each other, so far as the general 
cause is concerned. But their typical forms are 
distinct, and will be divided according to the 
source from which they arise and the correspond- 
ence between the locus of the cause and the locali- 
ization of the sensation. 

1 . Peripheral Sensations = Sensations initiated by 
a stimulus external to the sensoriwn (not neces- 
sarily external to the body). Localized more or 
less definitely, and most highly developed in the 
particular senses. 

(#) Epi-peripheral Sensations = Those which origi- 
nate and are localized on the external surface 
of the body. The six special senses. 

(b) Ento-peripheral Sensations = Those which orig- 
inate and are localized at more or less specific 
points on the internal surface of the body. 
Ex. Sensations in the abdomen, stomach, 
breast, below the surface of the limbs, etc. 

2. Central Sensations = Sensations which are 
either initiated by central and organic action 
alone, or exhibit no definite relation between the 
stimulus and the localization of the sensation, or the 
stimulus, and which must in any case be referred 
to effects of central nervous action, spontaneous or 
instigated. Undifferentiated, and stimulus, if any, 
is not generally localized. 

(a) Systemic Feelings = General vital feelings, 
vigor or depression, feeling of respiration, 
headache, etc. 

(b) After Images = The continuance of a sensation 
long after the impression or stimulus has been 
removed. Localized. 



2 4 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(c) Dreams = Reproduction or origin from central 

action of images and feelings which cannot be 

attributed to outside stimulus. 
{d) Hallucinations = Persistent reproduction of 

either past or original images from central, 

usually abnormal action. 
(<?) Deliria = The reproduction or origination of 

images and feelings due to disease or artificial 

stimulants.* 

II. General Problems of Sensation. There are several 
characteristics of sensation which involve its quality, quan- 
tity and relations, and which are involved in Weber's Law of 
Intensity, Discriminative Sensibility, the Phenomena of Con- 
trast, and the Distinctive Functions of Sensation, They are 
not all equally determinable in all the senses, but are so 
general as to require treatment under sensations at large. 
§ ( i ) Weber-Fechner Law of Intensity. Every sen- 
sation has a certain intensity which can be more 
or less definitely measured in relation to stimulus. 
i. Form of Statement. Weber and Fechner differ 
in their statement of the law. The former dis- 
covered and the latter verified the law, and en- 
deavored to give it mathematical expression. 
Later experiments seem to show both that it is 
only approximate and that it has limitations. 
(«) Weber. The intensity of sensation increases 
with comparatively equal increments as stimuli 
increase with relatively equal increments. 
(b) Fechner. The intensity of sensation increases 

*Note. These are spoken of as sensations because they are productions of the 
sensory organism so exactly like those that are produced by external stimuli that 
in respect to contents there is no reason to distinguish them. It is only their 
different elation to reality and stimulus that justifies any distinction at all. 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



25 



with the logarithm of the stimulus ; or inten- 
sity of sensation increases in an arithmetical 
as stimulus increases in a geometrical ratio.* 

2. Methods of Measuring Intensity. There are 
three methods of determining the Weber-Fechner 
law of intensity, which corroborate each other. 
The object is to begin at the threshold, zero, or 
initial point of consciousness in sensations, which 
is the minimum of intensity, and to measure the 
rate of increase to the maximum intensity. All 
beyond these limits is indeterminate, except as it 
merges into pain at the upper limit. 

(a) Method of Least Perceptible Differences. Judg- 
ment of the mean between two given sensa- 
tions until the distinction is lost, or the ad- 
dition of increments to a given stimulus until 
a distinction is perceived. 

{b) Method of Average Errors. Judgment of the 
equality of sensations where the stimulus 
varies. The average of all trials determines the 
ratio of sensitiveness at that point in the scale. 

(c) Method of Correct and Mistaken Cases. Com- 
parison of right and wrong judgments of small 
increments and decrements of stimulus, and 
division of the whole number of trials by the 
right guesses. One- half the doubtful judg- 
ments is added to each side. 

3. Ratios of Intensity. The ratio between sensa- 
tion and stimulus is not the same for the different 
senses. For touch, temperature and hearing it 
is y ; muscular sense */i 7 , and for sight J /ioo. 
Smell and taste have not been measured. 

*Note. Both are substantially the same, though the latter is more definite and 
mathematical in expression. 



2 6 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

4. Meaning of the Weber-Fechner Law. There 
are two aspects in the mental economy of this law. 
It has been variously assigned a psycho-physical, 
physiological and a psychological value, but what 
is true in these clauses can be summarized in two 
features of this law. 

(a) An illustration of the general law of relativity 
in mental states. Compare contrast. 

(b) An indication of the law of adjustment to 
environment. 

5. Mathematics and Psychology. The ratio be- 
tween stimulus and sensation seems to support the 
application of mathematics to psychology, but in 
reality sensation is not measured ; only differences 
are observed which whether quantitative or quali- 
tative are incommensurable. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 16-23; B. Ele., pp. 103-105; H. Out., pp. 109- 
117; D. Psy., pp. 52-54; Ladd. Out, pp. 271-289; James, Psy., Vol. I., pp. 
533-550; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 86-90; Ladd. Psy., pp. 132-140: Ribot 
German Psychology of To-Day, pp. 134-187. 

§ (2) Discriminative Perception. Discriminative 
perception is the fineness of sense distinctions be- 
tween plural impressions, whether simultaneous or 
successive and independent of intensity. It is 
therefore qualitative and not quantitative, and 
represents differences in impressions which pre- 
vent their fusion into a single perception. There 
are certain limits to this discrimination which vary 
in different portions of the body, and it is confined 
to touch and sight, including probably the thermal 
sense. Its incidents arc : 
1. SENSORY CIRCLES. Sensory circles are the areas 
within which all impressions seem single. They 
are elliptical in shape, their longitudinal axis coin- 
ciding with the longitudinal axis of the body. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



27 



2. Size of Sensory Circles. Tip of tongue, 1 
millimeter ; tip of forefinger, 2 m. ; back of fore- 
finger, 16 m. ; back of hand, 31 m. ; back and 
shoulder blade, 68 m., or about 2 inches ; sight, 
from Woo to tattoo of an inch (210 to ?lo m). 

3. Characteristics of Sensory Circles. They 
are not a fixed quantity in any person, and point 
in general to space perceptions in an elementary 
form, though only magnitude is concerned in the 
case. 

(a) Experience modifies their size by decreasing 

them, narrowing their limits. 
(o) Passive motor sensations show finer discrim- 
inations than tactual impressions. 

References. D. Psy., pp. 55-56; J. Br. C, pp. 61-63; Ladd. Out., pp. 308- 
.315; Sully. H. M., pp. 94-96; 106. 

III. Phenomena of Contrast. Every sensation is modi- 
fied by a concomitant or sequent impression closely related 
to it. This is the law of contrast or relativity, and is more 
frequent in the sense of vision. It takes two forms, simul- 
taneous and successive. 

§ (1) Illustrations of Contrast. These consist of 
experiments, often of a very complex character, 
but also at times of very simple phenomena. 

1. After Images. Successive contrast. When 
negative they take the complementary color or are 
mere outlines, bright or dark, as the case may be. 

2. Comparison of Distinct Colors. Simultaneous 
contrast. Bright object brighter when its environ- 
ment is dark, and vice versa. 

See also experiments of various kinds. 
§ (2) Theories of Contrast. There are two attempts 
to explain the phenomena of contrast, according 
as it is regarded as a mental or organic process. 



2 8 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

i. Psychological Theory. This is the theory of 
Helmholtz, and it maintains that the contrast is a 
mental interpretation, an inference (unconscious) 
which terminates in an illusion. Internal or central. 

2. Physiological Theory. This is the theory of 
Hering, and it maintains that contrast is due to 
physiological action in the neural termini at the 
periphery, set up by an actual difference between 
the impressions on proximate areas of the sen- 
sorium. External or peripheral. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 85-87; J. Br. C, pp. 24-27, 44-46; H. Out., pp. 112- 
116; Ladd. Out., pp. 264; James Psy., Vol. II., pp. 13-31. 

IV. Functions of Sensation. Sensation is more than a 
mere reaction upon stimulus. If it were this only it would 
be like all physical phenomena in being nothing but a re- 
sultant of impinging forces. But it performs other functions, 
as a cause or stimulus to higher activities. They may be 
summarized as follows : 

§ ( 1 ) Indicator of Changes in Environment. Sen- 
sations (peripheral) occur only on the occasion of 
stimulus, and this indicates a change of external 
conditions which requires adaptation to them for 
protection and security, or for gratifying desire. 
Compare Weber-Fechner Law. 
§ (2) Symbolical of Reality. Sensation is the me- 
dium between the internal and the external world, 
and though it does not represent, it presents exter- 
nal events as facts to be known. 
§ (3) Stimulus to Reflective Consciousness. Sen- 
sation is a stimulus to higher activities as well as a 
resultant of external impressions, and prompts the 
formation of complex conceptions. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE SPECIAL SENSES 

I. Vision, or Sight. Denned. Vision is the color sense 
and par excellence the space sense, and becomes aware of 
objects without apparent contact. 

§ (i) Structure of the Eyes. General structure is 
that of two distinct instruments, which function, 
however, as one organ, 
i. Physiological Divisions. Membranes, scle- 
rotic, choroid, and retina. Lens, vitreous and 
aqueous humors, corona, pupil, and iris. Muscles : 
recti, internal and. external, superior and inferior; 
oblique, superior and' inferior. Retina, rods and 
cones. Blind spot = Physiological center. Optic 
nerve and chiasm. 
2. Psychological Divisions. Corresponding 
halves. Corresponding or identical and disparate 
points. Yellow spot, or fovea centralis = Psycho- 
logical center. Fusion or combination of images. 
Monocular and binocular vision. Accommoda- 
tion and convergence. Point of fixation. Median 
line or plane. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 28-39: Ladd. Out., pp. 79-91; Le Conte, Sight. 
{International Scientific Series) ; McKendrick and Snodgrass, Physiology of the 
Senses, pp. 96-155. 

§ (2) Functions of Vision. These are two, color and 
space perception, with their accompaniments. 

(29) 



3 o S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

i. Color Sensations and Perceptions. Color is 
the reaction of the optical center upon etherial 
vibrations impinging upon the retina and con- 
ducted to the appropriate brain center. 

(a) The Chromatic Scale. Four primary colors 
and two secondary. Of the former, red and 
green and blue and yellow are complementa- 
ries, and the latter are white and black. 
There are intermediate shades between each 
of these. Complementary colors defined. 
Color mixture. Color discrimination. 

(b) Qualities of Color Sensations. Intensity, satu- 
ration and tonality: defined. 

(c) Dicration of Color Sensations. This is longer 
than the impressions, as after images show. 
Positive and negative after images. 

(d) Retinal Zones and Color. The color perceived 
often is affected by the locality in the retina 
upon which the light falls. 

(<?) Color Blindness. Incapacity to distinguish 
certain colors. Two forms : blindness to red 
and blindness to green. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 40-47; B. Ele., pp. 90-93; D. Psy., pp. 98-72; Ladd, 
Out., pp. 254-265 ; McKendrick and Snodgrass, Physiology of the Senses, pp. 
155-170; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 115-121. 

2. Visual Perception of Space. The problem has 
sometimes been whether vision presented any spe- 
cial factors in the consciousness of space. But 
this is now so generally admitted to be a fact that 
it is only a question whether visual extension is 
original or acquired, native or empirical, and how 
this sense contributes to the conception. The 
general problem of space perception must be con- 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



31 



sidered by itself. But the question whether vision 
contains any data from which the conception can 
be determined can be presented in this place, and 
it is answered by the several factors, conditions, or 
sensory and mental processes connected with the 
visual consciousness of space, or at least presumed 
to be so connected. They are as follows, and may 
be called visual signs for space, some for magni- 
tude, and some for distance: 

(a) Distinctness of Retinal Images. Objects ap- 
pear dim or clear, according to distance, and 
we have to judge both magnitude and distance 
accordingly. 

(b) Retinal Magnitude. The magnitude of the 
image on the retina varies with distance, and 
experience enables us to judge of the two ac- 
cordingly. 

(c) The Strain of Accommodation . Muscular ef- 
fort to adjust the lens to distance accompanies 
visual perception, and may affect the judg- 
ment of space which coincides with it, appar- 
ently at least. 

(d) The Strain of Convergence. Binocular muscu- 
lar strain also accompanies visual perception 
and coincides with the localization of objects 
at the point of fixation, probably affecting the 
judgment of magnitude and distance. 

(e) The Parallax of Motion. Differences in the 
retinal velocity of moving images will give rise 
to the perception of difference of distance, 
when static images will not, and coinciding 
with actual distances from the eyes, or dis- 
tances that identical real motion would rep- 
resent. 



32 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(f) Mathematical Perspective. Mathematical out- 
lines representing retinal relations correspond- 
ing to the lines from solid objects, give rise to 
the notion of distance or solidity. 

{g) Aerial Perspective. This is due to the influ- 
ence of the atmosphere upon the dimness or 
distinctness of objects. Compare clear with 
smoky landscapes. 

(/z) Binocular Parallax. This is the difference 
between the two retinal images from the same 
object which gives rise to convergent muscular 
strain and its presumed effect. 

(z) The Distribution of Light and Shade. The un- 
equal distribution of light and shade on solids 
gives rise to a peculiar form of mathematical 
perspective, and with it the suggestion of real 
space relations known by it in experience. 
Limitation of it produces the effect. 

(/£) The Intervention of Objects. The number of 
intervening objects, with the mathematical and 
aerial perspective which they complete or 
make concrete, affects the judgment of magni- 
tude and distance. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 37-40, 335-350; B. Ele., pp. 1 18-122; D. Psy., 
162-172; H. Out., pp. 192-198; Murray, Handbook of Psychology, pp. 163-187; 
Ladd. Out., pp. 322-343; McKendrick and Snodgrass, Physiology of the Senses, 
pp. 170-192. 

§ (3) Theories of Color Perception. The number 
of colors and their relations as complementarics 
give rise to several theories to account for them, 
some referring them wholly to physiological action 
in the retina, some wholly to central action in the 
cortex, and others to the combined action of both. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



33 



All of them however, psychologically, are based 
upon the relations of the colors to each other, 
i . The Young-Helmholtz Theory. This theory 
holds that there are three primary colors, or fun- 
damental color sensations, and corresponding to 
them, three nerve or retinal elements, each of 
which responds only feebly to other than its 
proper color. 

2. The Theory of Hering. This theory assumes 
six elementary colors, three colors with their com- 
plementaries, black and white, green and red, blue 
and yellow. Black, green and blue he attributes 
to the process of building up visual substance, and 
their complementaries to breaking it down. 

3. The Theory of Wundt. This theory is too 
elaborate for brief statement, but it claims to ex- 
plain all color sensations by physiological action 
in the retina, except contrast, which it makes 
cerebral and mental. But its two elements are : 

(a) Constant internal retinal activity which pro- 
duces the sense of blackness. 

(b) External excitation setting up two processes, 
one a chromatic or color process, and the 
other an achromatic, or colorless process. 

(c) The chromatic process is of a uniform and the 
achromatic of a manifold photochemical char- 
acter. 

References. Ladd. Out., pp. 265-270; McKendrick and Snodgrass, Physiology 
of the Senses, pp. 161-1 70. Wundt, Human and Animal Psychology, pp. 103-104. 

II. Hearing or Audition. The sense of hearing, with the 
exception of smell, is the most subjective of all the senses ; 
only with the understanding, however, that its deliverances 
do not primarily give the form and position of objects which 



34 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



we generally demand for our adjustment to environment. 
Touch and sight are the test senses upon which we rely for 
immediate protection and security, and hence objects are 
most frequently interpreted in terms of their presentations. 
Independently of association, therefore, though they attest 
external reality, the sensations of sound do not give it in the 
presentative form that is most interesting and useful. Hence 
they appear mostly as sensations only. The organism for 
hearing is in some respects more complicated than sight. 
§ ( i ) Structure of the Ear. Its general structure in 

no respect resembles the eyes physiologically. 

There is no organism for them to act together as 

one instrument, 
i. Physiological Divisions. There are three 

general divisions of the auditory organism. 

(a) External Ear. The concha (shell), or ex- 
ternal organ, the meatus or entrance. 

(b) Middle Ear. The tympanum (drum), con- 
sisting of a membrane and cavity, with the 
Eustachian tube extending into the throat ; 
the bones of the ear, malleus (hammer), incus 
(anvil), and stapes (stirrup), and muscles at- 
tached to these. 

(c) Internal Ear. The labyrinth, consisting of a 
bony cavity divided into three portions, the 
vestibule, semi-circular canals, and the cochlea 
(snail shell). This contains membranes and 
fluids, and the organ and rods of Corti, with 
a large number of hair cells. 

2. Psychological Divisions. These also are 

fewer than in the case of sight, but resemble it in 

some respects. They are as follows : 

{a) Reflection. The shape of the external ear and 

of the meatus serve to vary the incidence of 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



35 



vibrations as they enter, according to the di- 
rection from which they come, and so affect 
the judgment of direction. 

(b) Accommodation. The tensor tympani, or tym- 
panic muscle, adjusts the drum to the nature 
of the vibrations so as to save its own action 
and to modify its sensibility to impressions. 

(c) Binaural Fusion. This represents the more-, 
accurate judgment of direction and locality 
when the sound originates outside the median 
plane, and is analogous to binocular vision. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 47-53; Ladd. Out., pp. 91-102; McKendrick, Phys. 
of Sen., pp. 200-240. 

§ (2) Functions of Hearing. These are, in general, 
the reception of sound vibrations and the sensory 
reactions. Space perception, however, in this 
sense is largely a matter of association and infer- 
ence. 
1. Qualities of Sound. There are three main 
characteristics of sound, which vary in their pro- 
portions to each other and affect the variety of 
sound sensations. 

{a) Pitch, or Altitude. This is the quality which 
determines the place of a sound in the scale 
of music, and it is conditioned by the number 
of vibrations impinging upon the tympanum 
in a given time. Limits of pitch. 

(b) Tone or Timbre. This is the quality of sound 
which determines whether it shall be music or 
mere noise, and is determined by the character 
of the vibrations producing it. 

(c) Volume or Amount. This is the quality of a 
sound which represents its intensity or loud- 



36 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ness. It is determined by the amplitude of 
the vibrations producing it. 

2. Harmony and Discord. They can be defined 
respectively as agreeable and disagreeable sounds. 
Their causes are still a matter of conjecture. But 
they are connected with the phenomena of simul- 
taneous and successive sounds of different pitch, 
rather than of different tone and volume. 

3. Incidents of Sound Sensations. There are 
two of these worth noticing, as closely connected 
with the organism of hearing. 

(a) Sympathetic Resonance. This is supposed to 
express the power of the membranous cochlea 
to analyze sounds, and to distribute them suit- 
ably to their origin. 

(U) Fusion of Sensations. This is the modification 
of a sound sensation by the fusion of different 
vibrations before the sensory reaction begins. 

4. Space Perception. The sense of direction is 
often tolerably distinct, and is probably due to the 
incidence of vibrations upon the tympanum and 
binaural fusion. The sense of distance is less 
clear, and is perhaps due to association in connec- 
tion with the kind and volume of sound. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 53-59; B. Ele., 89-90; D., pp. 64-68; Ladd, Out., 
pp. 245-253; McKendrick, etc., Phys. of Sen., pp. 240-284; Sully, H. M., Vol. 
I., pp. 109-114. 

III. Touch or Taction. This sense is perfectly simple 
in its organization, and is distributed throughout the entire 
peripheral surface of the body. It is the main test sense for 
the existence of external reality, and is less liable to illusion 
than sight. 

§ (1) Structure of Touch. A neural terminus or 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



37 



ganglion of gray matter, consisting of {a) touch cells, 
(#) Pacinian corpuscles, (c) tactile corpuscles, and 
(d) end bulbs. 
§ (2) Functions of Touch. The general function is 
simple reaction to contact from external bodies. 
But the sense also is connected intimately with 
space through two forms of localization. 

1. Tactual Sensation. There are two forms of 
tactual sensation, according as the stimulus is fixed 
or moving. 

{a) Pressure or Resistance. This is the mere con- 
sciousness of contact from an external object, 
and varies with the condition and structure of 
the organism. 

(b) Motion or Movement. This is the conscious- 
ness of a continuous change of place in the 
action either of the stimulus or of the senso- 
rium, and may be active or passive. The for- 
mer is connected with muscular effort, and 
the latter with a moving stimulus. 

2. Space Perception. Touch is very prominent in 
the perception of extension. There are three ele- 
ments in what it contributes to this process, and 
together may be called localization. 

(#) Perception of Direction. In sensations of pres- 
sure and resistance, the direction from which 
the stimulus proceeds is very clearly appre- 
hended, and is vertical to the sensorium. 
This is the law of " eccentric projection." 

(#) Peripheral Localization. This is the localiza- 
tion of sensations at the periphery of the sen- 
sorium, and is explained by Lotze and other 
writers by a system of " local signs," or quali- 
tative differences in sensations due to differen- 
tial structures of the tactual nerves. 



38 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(c) Discriminative Localisation. This is that nu- 
merical distinction of plural impressions of 
a simultaneous order which is represented by 
the limits of " sensory circles," and which im- 
plies the consciousness of units of coexistence. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 60-63; B. Ele., pp. 94-95 ; D. Psy., pp. 47-56; Ladd, 
Out., pp. 237-238, 308-314; McKendrick and Snodgrass, Physiology of the Senses, 
pp. 41-64; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 103-108. 

IV. Temperature Sense. The existence of this sense, 
which was always identified with touch, is only a recent dis- 
covery, and it is shown to be an independent sense. Its ex- 
istence was conjectured by Sir William Hamilton, from the 
record of certain pathological cases (see Hamilton's Edition 
of Reid's Works, Vol. II., p. 875), and was proved by the 
experiments of Goldscheider, Blix and Donaldson. These 
showed the existence of separate nerves for temperature, and 
even separate nerves for the sensations of heat and cold. It 
is decidedly a subjective sense. 

§ (1) Structure of the Thermal Sense. The an- 
atomical structure of this sense has not been determined. 

§ (2) Functions of the Thermal Sense. The sen- 
sations of heat and cold illustrate very clearly the 
law of relativity. They vary more distinctly than 
tactual sensations, according to the temperature of 

the body, or parts of the body affected. 
4 
References. J. Br. C, pp. 63-64; B. Ele., pp. 95-96; D. Psy., pp. 74-75 ; 

Ladd. Out., pp. 239-242 and 314; Sully. H. M., Vol. I., p. 107; McKendrick 
and Snodgrass, Phys. of Sen., pp. 64-67. • 

V. Taste and Smell. Organically the two senses are 
closely connected, though showing different physiological 
structures and functions. They have little psychological 
interest. The sense of taste is probably wholly chemical, 
and smell both chemical and mechanical. For the structure 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



39 



and functions of these senses see any good physiology. Also 
McKendrick and Snodgrass, Phys. of Sen., pp. 70-97. 

VI. The "Muscular" Sense. There are some doubts 
and difficulties regarding the existence of a "muscular" 
sense, and also in regard to its nature when its existence is 
admitted. These grow out of a double ambiguity: first, the 
confusion of particular sensations accompanying muscular 
action with the notion of the supposed sensory character, of 
the muscular organism, and second, the ambiguity of the ex- 
pression " motor consciousness," which is sometimes used to 
denote the consciousness of motion, which is a sensation, and 
sometimes to denote the consciousness initiating muscular 
action, which is not a sensation. The problem requires ap- 
proach through the facts. 

§ (1) Facts of Muscular Sensation. Several facts 
are of importance in deciding the existence of 
such a sense and its distinction from touch. 

1. Sensations of Active Movement. These are 
distinguished from the sensations of passive move- 
ment, and are attended with a greater tendency to 
weariness. 

2. Consciousness of Effort. " Muscular" as dis- 
tinct from tactual sensations are accompanied by 
the feeling of expended energy, the so-called 
" feeling of effort," riot noticeable in passive touch. 

3. Great Discriminative Sensibility. The ratio 
for touch, according to the Weber-Fichner law, is 
\, for the muscular effort, tV, which would seem 
to indicate a different and more delicate sensory 
organism for muscular action than for touch. 

§ (2) Theories of Muscular Sensation. There are 
three theories according to the desire to distin- 
guish muscular from tactual sensations. One 



4 o S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

makes it equivalent to active touch, one wholly 
separates it from touch, and one is a compromise 
or intermediate view. 
i. Epi-peripheral THEORY. This theory maintains 
that the so called muscular sensations are simply 
tactual sensations caused by pressure and friction 
of the muscles, joint pressure, etc. 

2. Ento-peripheral THEORY. This theory main- 
tains that muscular sensations are due to pressure 
of contracted muscles upon afferent nerves dis- 
tributed among the muscles, and more delicate 
than the sensory nerves of the periphery, but 
tactual in their nature. 

3. Central Motor Theory. This theory main- 
tains that muscular sensations are of central origin, 
and are an expression of the motor apparatus, not 
the sensory proper. They are, therefore, called 
" innervation sensations," or feelings of effort, and 
wholly distinct from touch. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 65, 66, 70-74; B. Ele., pp. 96-101; D. Psy., pp. 56- 
58; H., pp. 117-121J Ladd. Out., pp. 242-244; McKendrick, etc., pp. 68-70; 
James, Psy., Vol. II., pp. 189-202; Sully. H. M., Vol. I., pp. 122-132; Bain. 
Senses and Intellect, pp. 59-100. Foster. Physiology. 



CHAPTER V 

CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATTENTION 

I. Consciousness. Origin and history of the term. 
Greek ovvslfyois and Latin conscientia = concomitant knowl- 
edge : knowing that we know. Influence of Descartes to 
make it denote a special function of mind. Tendency of the 
term to denote self-consciousness. 

§ (i) Nature of Consciousness. Consciousness 
strictly taken is indefinable, and can only be de- 
scribed. It is itself the most generic of mental 
states, not being reducible to any other, but re- 
ducing all others to itself. A description of it 
will be a proximate definition. 
i. Proximate Definitions. Though not logically 
definable, certain fundamental elements distinguish 
it from the special forms assumed by mental states. 
Some are positive and some are negative. 

(a) Consciousness is not a special faculty or organ 
of mind : not independent of special states. 

(b) Consciousness is not a mere mechanical event 
like external phenomena. 

(c) Consciousness is the basic or essential element 
of all specific mental states : "the complement 
of all the mental energies." 

(d) Consciousness is the form and condition of all 
knowledge, and is the subjective side of mental 
events, of which the thing known is the objec- 
tive side. 

(40 



42 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



Referetices. B. Ele., pp. 56-57; Hamilton Lects. on Meta., Lect. XL, Sully, 
H. M., Vol. I., p. 76. 

2. Characteristics of Consciousness. There are 
several characteristics of consciousness which 
make it a unique phenomenon among events and 
determine its significance in the world. They 
are : 

(a) Unity. Consciousness is a stream of events 
connected in such a way as to make all its 
individual elements form a complex whole 
without regard to time : a series of phenomena 
plus a knowledge of both the units and the 
series as possessions of the mind. 

(b) Continuity. Consciousness is without any 
sensible interruptions, breaks, or divisions to 
the person having it. Sleep, fainting, som- 
nambulism, and often delirium, are wholly 
outside the normal stream of consciousness, 
and though they involve intervals of time be- 
tween one conscious state and another, do not 
interrupt the apparent continuity of the series. 

(c~) Instability . The series of consciousness shows 
a constant fluctuation or oscillation of the 
mind from one object to another. The sense 
of change grows out of the perception of pass- 
ing time, and the transfer of consciousness 
from object to object, influenced probably by 
fatigued interest. 

(d) Personality. Consciousness always has a per- 
sonal reference, a reference to the self that has 
it. Its unity and its nature as knowledge 
establish the existence and the unity of the 
subject in a way which can be expressed only 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



43 



by the conception of personality. Different 
meanings of the term "personality." 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 151-175; Ladd. Psy., pp. 29-48; Hamilton, Lects. 
on Meta., Lect. XI. 

3. Implications of Consciousness. A funda- 
mental element of consciousness is its relativity, 
or twofold implication of its existence as an event 
or phenomenon. 

(a) Reference to a Subject or Ego. Consciousness 
as an event implies a subject, the ego which is 
aware both of itself and of its own states. 
Consciousness always involves either an im- 
plicit or explicit reference to a self. 

Meaning of the term "Ego." Empirical 
and transcendental Egos. 

(b) Reference to an Object, or Non-ego. Conscious- 
ness always has an object about which it is 
occupied, whether internal or external, a thing 
or event of which it is aware. That is to say, 
it always has a content which prevents it from 
being a fact, or event without a meaning. 

References. Hamilton, Lect. on Meta., Lect. XL; J. Br. C, pp. 151-195; B. 
Ele., pp. 56-57. 

§ (2) Problems of Consciousness. Several questions 
are incident to the nature of consciousness as 
knowledge and as the unity of a mental series, and 
of different mental states. 
1. Personal Identity. Personal identity is the 
sameness and persistence of the self in all the 
changes of its states, the continuance of the sub- 
ject or substratum of consciousness with those 
marks in the series of mental events which show 
their connection with a single subject. 



44 S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

Controversy about personal identity and its 
grounds. Consequences of denying it. 

2. Mutations of Personality. There are such 
modifications of the mental series and its unity as. 
to suggest the existence of more than one subject 
in the same organism. Examples, somnambulism, 
hypnotic trance, certain forms of delusion, etc. 

Ambiguous import of the term "personality." 
Changes of personality refer only to alterations in 
the empirical, not the transcendental Ego. 

3. Authority of Consciousness. Consciousness 
is the ultimate court of appeal for knowledge and 
belief. Its authority depends upon the area of its 
application, or the field of its genuine deliverances. 

Is consciousness fallible or infallible? What 
can be said of the maxim, "falsus in uno, falsus 
in omnibus" as applied to it? 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 195-216; Hamilton, Lect. on Meta., Lects. XV. 
and XVI. 

§ (3) Theories of Consciousness. The theories of 
the origin and ground of consciousness concern 
the nature of its subject, or of the mind, whether 
it is material or spiritual. The problem is to as- 
certain whether consciousness is an incident of 
brain activity, or the activity of a subject other 
than the brain. There are, therefore, two theories : 
1 . Materialism. This theory holds that conscious- 
ness is a function of the brain, a mode of molecu- 
lar motion peculiar to nervous organism. 

Import and consequences of this theory. Two 
forms of the theory. 

(a) Monistic = Materialistic Pantheism. 

(b) Diialistic = Materialistic Atomism. 



5 YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 45 

2. Spiritualism. This theory holds that conscious- 
ness is not a brain function, but the phenomenon 
of some other and immaterial subject. 

Difficulties of the term ; distinguished from 
Spiritism. Two forms of the theory. 
{a) Monistic = Idealistic Pantheism. 

(b) Dualistic = Cartesian Dualism. 

(4) Sub-liminal Mental Modifications. These 
are states, whether physiological or psychological, 
which are independent of the ordinary stream of 
consciousness, and are often spoken of as " uncon- 
scious " activities. Difficulties of the term " un- 
conscious " in mental action. 

1. History of the Doctrine. Leibnitz, Hamil- 
ton, Carpenter (" unconscious cerebration"). The 
doctrine has passed from the conception of uncon- 
scious mental modifications to that of imperfect and 
sub-liminal intelligence. 

2. Evidence of Sub-liminal Intelligence. A 
variety of phenomena point to the conclusion 
either that sub-liminal modifications are not phys- 
iological, or that all mental acts are physiological. 
{a) Post-hypnotic Suggestions. Actions under this 

influence show all the adaptations of intelli- 
gence. Illustrations. 
($) Automatisms. Automatisms are involuntary 
events which often attest, or seem to attest, 
more than the subject's brain action, and per- 
haps always certain intelligent adaptations 
which contrast with mechanical phenomena. 
Illustrations. 

(c) Somnambulic Phenomena. These are sponta- 
neous actions in sleep, natural or artificial, 
which exhibit the various adjustments of in- 
telligence. Illustrations. 



4 g SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

3. Theories of Sub-liminal Actions. There are 

three theories to account for these phenomena. 

(a) Unconsciotis Cerebration. This theory holds 
that all sub-liminal actions emerging finally in 
consciousness or resembling intelligence, are 
purely physiological effects of the nervous 
system based upon antecedent experiences. 
(Carpenter.) 

b) Disintegrating Personality. This theory holds 
that the normal stream of consciousness is a 
complex total whose integrity is so disturbed 
by the abstraction or elimination of any one 
or more elements (diminution of the range or 
compass), that sub-liminal modifications do 
not appear to be a part of it. (Pierre Janet, 
etc.) 

(c) Transcendental Intelligence . This theory holds 
that personality or mental function can extend 
beyond the normal and empirical stream of 
consciousness, and occasionally obtrudes its 
products upon the normal series as unaccount- 
able events. 

References. Hamilton, Lect. on Meta., Lect. XVIII.; Carpenter, Mental Phys- 
iology, Book II., Chapter XIII., pp. 515-543, and Chapter XV., pp. 568-610 
(Fourth Edition); James, Psy., Vol. I., pp. 164-176; See also Binet, Les Alter- 
ations de la Personalite, and Pierre Janet, Etat Mental des Hysteriques; Bald- 
win, Hand-Book of Psychology, Vol. I., Chapter IV., pp. 45-58; F. P. Cobbe, 
Darwinism in Morals and Other Essays, Essay XL, Unconscious Cerebration; 
Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, Third Series, Problem II., Chapter X.; Mill, 
Examination of Hamilton, Chapter XV. 

II. Attention. Etymology of the term (attineo ; ad and 
teneo). It is a general name for the persistence of conscious- 
nesss in a certain direction, and describes a concentrated as 
opposed to a distracted state of mind. It is the act of mind 
which is most intimately connected with all of man's higher 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOLOG Y 



47 



and reflective knowledge, by fixing consciousness upon the 
nature, connections and meaning of all phenomena for a 
system of truth and the adjustment of conduct. 

§ ( i ) Definition of Attention. Attention is the con- 
centration of the mind upon some particular ob- 
ject in the field of consciousness. The field of 
consciousness is the number of simultaneous and 
successive objects which affect the mind for more 
or less cognition, which is considerably narrowed 
by attention. Attention may also be called "de- 
tention in consciousness." The main qualities 
which describe it are : 
i. Persistence of Interest. The same object re- 
mains the center of thought. 

2. Tension, or a Sense of Strain. All attention 
is accompanied by a feeling of effort, or intensified 
activity. 

3. Abstraction, or Suppression of Indirect 
Perception. The mind is drawn away from some 
objects to be absorbed in others. 

4. Relation to the Will. Attention is incipient 
will, or readily involves it by its selective nature, 
whether purposive or not. 

§ (2) Divisions of Attention. The forms of atten- 
tion are ditermined by the principal events eliciting 
them, and subdivided according to the objects af- 
fecting the process. They are : 
1. Reflex or Involuntary Attention. This is 
the sudden diversion of the mind to an object by 
some stimulus, internal or external, or the merely 
passive submission of the mind to the stream of 
events as they occur. It is also called spon- 
taneous, which is a better term than involuntary. 
This form of attention may be sensorial or intellec- 



48 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

tual, according as the object is of sense or of intel- 
lect, external or internal. 
2. Deliberate or Voluntary Attention. This 
is attention determined intelligently with reference 
to an end to be served by fixing the mind on an 
object. It involves an active effort of mind inde- 
pendent of reflex action. It may also be sensorial 
or intellectual. Voluntary attention involves the 
will directly, while reflex attention cannot be more 
than incipient volition. 

References. J.Br. C, pp. 217, 220-227; B. Ele., pp. 72-75; Sully, H. M., 
Vol. I., pp. 141-146, 161-166; James, Psy., Vol. I., Ch. XL, pp. 402-404, 416- 
420; Mind, N. S., Vol. III., p. 449; Carpenter, Ment. Phys., Bk. I., Ch. III. 

§ (3) Incidents of Attention. Attention has a num- 
ber of characteristics which describe its nature and 
function in the mental economy, and show its re- 
lation to knowledge in general. They are : 
1. Compass or Area of Attention. The compass 
or area of attention represents the number of dis- 
tinct objects which can be seen and distinguished 
by a simple instantaneous act of mind. The num- 
ber varies according to certain laws. 

(a) There was an old controversy as to whether 
the mind could perceive more than one thing 
at a time, and this dispute was supposed to 
affect the unity of the subject or ego. 

(b) Experiments show that consciousness can per- 
ceive clearly more than one thing in a single 
act. The highest number is supposed to be 
six or eight objects, though it may recognize 
more if they are arranged in groups. 

(c) The difficulty of supposing that the perception 
is perfectly instantaneous arises from the fact 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



49 



that it may be complicated with after-sensa- 
tions or images. 
(d) In ordinary experience this difficulty is still 
farther complicated by the rapid movement of 
attention from one object to another. 

References. J. Br. C, p. 219; id., Psy., Vol. I., pp. 405-416; Sully, H. M., Vol. 
I., p. 160. 

2. Oscillation of Attention. Attention does not 
seem to be absolutely fixed upon any object for 
any long period of time, but fluctuates from one 
to the other. This is more particularly true of 
reflex than of deliberate attention, which may be 
considerably prolonged under the right conditions. 
The disturbing factors of persistent attention mak- 
ing it intermittent are : — 

{a) The degree of painful tension. If the effort to 
fix attention be great or disagreeable, it will 
fluctuate easily. 

(b) Rivalry in impressions. The struggle and 
alternation of various impressions in the same 
or different fields will disturb fixed attention. 
Illustrate by experiment. 

(c) General and Special Fatigue. General weari- 
ness, physical or mental, weakens the power 
of concentration, and more especially will 
fatigue, due to any prolonged effort in one 
direction, produce oscillation. 

It is thus apparent that persistent attention, 
whether reflex or voluntary, will depend upon 
its agreeableness. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 224-226; id., Psy., Vol. I., pp. 420-423; Sully, H, M., 
Vol. I., pp. 155-158. 

3. Effects of Attention. The existence of atten- 



jj O s YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

tion produces various effects upon consciousness 
and its particular occupation, while the frequency 
and persistency of it exercise an important in- 
fluence upon the general mental organism and 
iorms of conduct. These several influences are as 
follows : 
{a) Increased intensity of mental states. This is 

alike noticeable in sensations, feelings and 

intellectual operations. 
{b) Increased definiteness of perception. Attention 

brings an object into clear consciousness and 

facilitates the mental process of assimilation. 

(c) Suppression of the indirect field. The indirect 
field of perception is diminished in clearness 
in the same proportion as the direct field is 
increased. The effect is a state of abstraction 
in which all objects are neglected except that 
of attention. . 

(d) Detention and prolongation of mental states. 
The effect in this case is to continue impres- 
sions until the higher powers of memory and 
association may utilize them. 

(e) Facilitation of retention. Attention is more or 
less a condition of memory, in that it implies 
and increases mental interest in the object. 

(y) Fatigue of sensorial and mental functions. 
The exercise of attention produces weariness 
precisely in the same way that prolonged work 
does, and rest can be obtained only by relaxa- 
tion of its tension, or by oscillation. 

References. J. Br. C, p. 222; B. Ele., pp. 72-79; Sully, H. M., pp. 166-168; 
Dewey, Psy., pp. 132-147. 

4. Educational Value of Attention. The edu- 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



51 



cational value and influence of attention depends 
wholly upon two conditions: (1) The power of 
self-control possessed by the subject, and (2) the 
kind of attention involved. 

(a) The persistence of oscillation in attention 
leads to distraction, or flightiness in ideas and 
trains of thought. 

(b) The persistence of reflex and automatic atten- 
tion in one direction leads to insistent and 
finally to fixed ideas, insanity in many cases 
being nothing but one or the other of these 
states. 

(c) The cultivation of voluntary attention and its 
adjustment to the general demands of the 
system, mental and physical, with the assimi- 
lation that it favors, is the condition of all 
higher education, intellectual and moral. 

(d) Habits of attention of the voluntary kind are 
the first stages of moral discipline and sacri- 
fice in breaking up the insistent tendencies of 
reflex attention. 

References. J. Br. C, p. 236; B. Ele., p. 79; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 76, 389, 
401, 473- 

§ (4) Attention and the Will. The will is the mind's 
active power, the cause of volition, and attention 
seems to be wholly a cognitive function. But this 
latter is not strictly true. Attention may involve 
he will in all its stages of development. It cer- 
tainly does in the voluntary form where it is con- 
ditioned by volition. The whole matter must be 
determined by the question whether will shall 
mean deliberative volition and not also include the 
so called reflex or involuntary response to stimulus. 



e 2 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

i . Deliberate Attention. In this form the atten- 
tion to an object is consciously initiated and the 
will is the chief factor in the result. Attention 
thus becomes but a name for the combined func- 
tions of volition, and abstraction or limited cogni- 
tion. 

2. Non-Deliberate Attention. Though called 
reflex or involuntary, the will may still be the 
cause in the conscious recognition of a stimulus, 
although its meaning and the maximum degree of 
sensation may have yet to develop. But the con- 
sciousness of interruption or disturbance in the 
equilibrium of mental conditions, is enough to 
make the attention voluntary, though not delib- 
erate. 

References. J. Br. C, p. 237; B. Ele., pp. 313-318; Sully, H. M., Vol. II., pp. 
177, 289. 



CHAPTER VI 
APPREHENSION OR INTUITION 

I. Nature of Apprehension. Apprehension as a mental 
act is distinguished ordinarily from sensation, as its ante- 
cedent condition, and from the more complex mental acts 
such as memory, comparison, conception, judgment and 
reasoning. It is, however, the fundamental and essential 
type of all consciousness in its most comprehensive import. 
The various mental acts usually distinguished from it, in fact 
differ from it only in object matter, and not in their form or 
process of action. Nevertheless the term usually applies to 
more elementary processes and data of knowledge, so that 
it will have to be treated in both its narrower and its more 
comprehensive import. 

§ (i) Definition of Apprehension. There is con- 
siderable difficulty in defining apprehension, owing 
to three facts : (a) the difference of opinion in re- 
gard to its nature and range of action; (b) the 
comprehensive meaning of the term in common 
and psychological usage ; and (c) the elementary 
and fundamental character of the act. To define 
it in one way might beg the question of philosophy 
with one school, and in another way it might beg 
the question of the opposite school. Thus to 
make it the act by which we know an external 
reality might offend the idealist, and to define it 
as, a merely combining process applied to sensa- 
tions might offend the realist. Again, if it be a 
(53) 



54 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

simple or ultimate act, it cannot be defined at all. 
But in spite of these difficulties, there is one com- 
mon characteristic by which every conception of 
it may be denoted, and which does not require us 
to take sides with any special school of philosophy 
regarding its implications. Moreover, this mean- 
ing of the term will comprehend the element char- 
acteristic of every mental act in which a fact of any 
kind gets recognition or a place in consciousness. 

Apprehension, therefore, is that act of conscious- 
ness by which the mind becomes AWARE of a fact or 
experience, as distinct from HAVING it or being 
affected by it. This conception of it is broad 
enough to distinguish it from the merely passive 
reactions to stimulus occurring in the reflexes and 
sensations, and explicitly states its chief character- 
istic as intuitive or apprehensive. The nature of 
the process is the same, whether it is one distin- 
guishing between sensation and its object, sensa- 
tion and its subject, or between two sensations. In 
all cases it is the consciousness of a fact as a fact, 
rather than its mere occurrence as a fact, that is 
denoted by the term. Where it becomes the intu- 
ition of one's own states it gets the name of self- 
consciousness, but this name does not hinder the 
act from being a simple intuition, which it is, men- 
tal acts differently named being different only in 
their matter or objects, not in their process. The 
consequence is that the term intuition or apprehen- 
sion is generally reserved for an act which in reality 
cannot be formally distinguished from other mental 
acts, or denotes a form of consciousness which is 
often charged with being an illusion, namely, the 
intuitive consciousness of external reality. But by 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 55 

making it essentially the consciousness of a fact, 
rather than merely having an experience, we 
obtain its most distinct characteristic. Its com- 
plex nature can be seen by analyzing it into its 
various elements. 
§ (2) Characteristics of Apprehension. These are 
the qualities and implications assumed to be in- 
volved in it. 

1. It is always the complement of sensation. Every 
sensation must be accompanied by apprehension, 
either as a condition of its being known or as a 
condition of knowing the cause or object of sensa- 
tion. 

2. In relation to external reality it is the objective or 
cognitive element, and sensation the subjective or 
affective side of consciousness. 

3. It is the act of mind which posits a reality other 
than the mere fact of sensation, and hence becomes 
the judgment of existence other than mere feeling. 

4. It is the active side of consciousness, of which sen- 
sation and feeling are the passive side. 

§ (3) The Forms of Apprehension. The act of ap- 
prehension may be directed to two distinct fields, 
according as the phenomena are mental or extra- 
mental, as objects of cognition. It is the funda- 
mental characteristic of all intellectual acts as the 
consciousness of something. The process is intu- 
itive and acquisitive in its nature, and occupies two 
fields. 
1. External Apprehension. This is the appre- 
hension of facts, events, or phenomena which per- 
tain to the external world, though it may not 
involve the conception of such a world in its 
unity. It is the field of the several senses, and 



ijg SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

hence the consciousness of facts that are not self- 
originated. 
2. Internal Apprehension. This is the apprehen- 
sion of one's own mental actions, or self-conscious- 
ness, though not involving the conception of their 
unity in the same subject, but only as facts of ex- 
perience. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 312-317; H., Out., pp. 101-120; Hamilton, Lects. 
on Meta., Lect. XXIV. 

§ (4) Relation of Apprehension to Association 
and Inference. The processes of association 
and inference are often made a part of apprehen- 
sion (perception) when this act is supposed to attest 
a reality other than sensations. Association, how- 
ever, is purely subjective. The error arises from 
the assumption that external objects cannot be 
given in sensations or subjective feelings, and hence 
in order to account for the additional datum resort 
is had to association and inference. But these 
cannot give, they presuppose apprehension. Their 
nature and functions are briefly as follows, and 
are compared with intuition. 

1 . Association is the recall and connection of preserit 
and past experiences. It does not judge of any 
reality other than this connection, and it is a con- 
nection only for the mind. 

2. Inference is a conclusion from facts given in con- 
sciousness to other facts, and so in relation to in- 
tuition, is an anticipation of experience or appre- 
hension. 

Thus, to illustrate both processes, I see a round 
yellow object or patch of color. Association sim- 
ply connects this experience with a similar one in 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 57 

the past connected with an object known as an 
orange. Inference follows to suppose that this ex- 
perience is also caused by the same object having 
other qualities than those in the visual presenta- 
tion, and which are necessary to its being an 
orange. This is an anticipation of experience as 
presenting those qualities, when they will be intui- 
tions. 
3. Apprehension or intuition is the direct and deter- 
minate realization in consciousness of the fact or 
object, quality or thing known, and hence will al- 
ways be a presentation involving a judgment of 
real existence other than either an associated con- 
tent or an inferred object. 

This conception of it, therefore, makes us take 
issue with those who speak of perception or intui- 
tion as conditioned by these processes (association 
and inference). The contents of certain intuitions 
may be so conditioned, but not the nature and pro- 
cess of apprehension as a fundamental act of mind. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 312-316; B., Ele., p. 111; H., Out., pp. 120-130; 
McCosh, Intuitions of the Mind, pp. 101-136; Hamilton, Lects. on Meta., Lects. 
XXIV-XXVI; Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 253-268. 

§ (5) The Elements of Apprehension. The totality 
expressed or implied by the term is complex and 
involves a consideration of two things, the process 
and the product or object. The term strictly ap- 
plies to a process, but this always has its object, 
the process being the constant and the object 
being the variable factor in the totality. 
1. The PROCESS. The process is the act of appre- 
hension and comprises several functions. 
(a) Attention. It is not enough to have an im- 
pression upon the mind or organism. We 



5 8 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

must be aware of it, and this requires more or 
less concentration of attention. 

{b) Localization. Every event in consciousness 
has a place or position in relation to some 
other. This may be a position in space, or a 
position in time. 

(c) Discrimination. Attention and localization 
imply, or are followed by, the distinct appre- 
hension of a fact, apart from other elements in 
the total of consciousness or the impression. 
Attention determines selection and localization 
relation. The act involves analysis. 

{d) Comprehension. Discrimination has compre- 
hension as a complementary process, which is 
the simultaneous grasping of the various ob- 
jects of apprehension in one complex whole. 
The act involves synthesis. 
2. The Objects. The objects of apprehension are 

the facts, events and realities apprehended, and 

must be distinguished from the act. They are : 

(a) Space. Space or extension is the form of ex- 
ternal apprehension. All sensations involve 
it to some extent, either as extra-organic 
events, located beyond the sensorium, or intra- 
organic states, located within the body or 
upon it ; that is, sensorial events have a special 
meaning. 

(5) Time. Time or succession is the form of in- 
ternal events. Mental states, as such, are not 
consciously related to space, but can be con- 
ceived only in an order of time. External 
events may be conceived in the same order, 
but only as successively represented to con- 
sciousness. 



6- YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 59 

(c) Events. Besides space and time the various 
facts or phenomena of nature and conscious- 
ness are objects of intuition. The facts of 
nature are the movements or dynamic qualities 
of things, and the facts or consciousness are 
the various mental states. 

(d) Things. The realities of which events are the 
actions, and qualities the attributes, are also 
objects of intuition. What they are and 
whether they are different from phenomena 
may be a question. In the unreflective stage 
of knowledge, they are inseparably bound up 
with static properties, the distinction between 
qualities and things, or phenomena and reality, 
not being consciously drawn or made signifi- 
cant. " 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 244-252; B. Ele., iri-114; Ladd. Out, pp. 292- 
302. 

§ (6) Mental Time. There is always an interval of 
time between stimulus or impressions (except in 
preperceptions) and other events occurring in 
consciousness. Hence it is a factor in the process 
of apprehension, or at least intimately connected 
with it in both its lower and higher forms. There 
are several forms and modifications of it to be 
considered. 
1 . Forms of Mental Time. There are three forms 
of mental time, determined by the question whether 
it is simple sensation, apperception, or association 
that is involved. 
(a) Reaction Time. This is the interval between 

stimulus and reaction. It is from .12 to .2 of 

a second. 



6o S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

(b) Discrimination Time. This is the interval 
between reaction time and apperception. It 
is from .05 to .15 of a second. 

(c) Association Time. This is the interval between 
apperception and the reproduction of an as- 
sociated object. The shortest period is .75 or 
.8 of a second. 

2. Modifications of Mental Time. Various in- 
fluences modify the intervals mentioned. They 
are : 

(a) Repetition. This shortens mental time. 
(#) Attention. This also shortens mental time. 

(c) Rythmic Stimulus. This shortens it and may 
wholly overcome it, and give rise to preper- 
ception. 

(d) Fatigue. This lengthens mental time. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 120-132; B. Ele., pp. 106-110; Ladd., Out., pp. 
361-380; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 31, 155,287,451; Vol. II., p. 257; James, 
Psy., Vol. I., pp. 81-104. 

II. The Apprehension of Space. The various problems 
of space apprehension have grown out of the question 
whether the idea of space is natural or acquired, innate or 
derived from experience, and have extended into the ques- 
tion as to its conditions or the elements of mental action 
entering into the process, no matter whether we regard it as 
original or acquired. But much of the controversy has 
grown out of the confusion incident to an equivocal concep- 
tion of space. Hence it is necessary to ascertain what we 
are dealing with in that notion. 

§ (1) MEANING OF Space. Space is strictly indefinable 
as being an elementary conception itself. But its 
characteristics can be named. It is represented in 
two different forms, according as we are thinking 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY fa 

of space as a whole, infinite extension, or particu- 
lar portions, limited quantities of it. 
i. Indefinite Space. This is space in the abstract, 
and without regard to any limitations. As a con- 
ception it is simply the general notion of a quality 
in sensation and apprehension, or the object of 
them, which is other than color, weight, etc., and 
expresses the possibility of motion, measurement, 
direction, mass, etc., or length, breadth and depth 
without limits. 
2. Definite Space. This is space in the concrete, 
and as expressed with definite limitations. It is 
defined by magnitude and distance as definite 
quantities or portions of extension as a whole, and 
is conceived as determinate length, breadth and 
depth circumscribed by points of co-existence, or 
lines which fix its commensurable limitations. 
(2) Elements of Space Apprehension. These are 
the phenomena that either condition it, or are 
occasions on which it may occur, and will include 
all incidents, events, experiences, functions, obser- 
vations and experiments that illustrate or determine 
it. They assume no theory of either the nature or 
the origin of space perception as of an indefinite, 
but only of a definite form ; that is, magnitude and 
distance. 

1. Sensory Circles. 

2. Phenomena of Localization. 

3. Motor Sensations, or Sensations of Movement. 
(a) Passive = Movements of objects over the sen- 

sorium. 
(£) Active = Muscular action and movements. 

4. Phenomena of Extensity or Voluminousness in 
Sensations. 



6 2 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

5. Binocular Vision. 

(a) Adjustment = Convergence and Accommoda- 
tion. 
(&) Parallax = Differences of retinal images. 

6. Association and Synthesis of Disparate presenta- 
tions. * 

7. Monocular Vision. 

(a) Retinal magnitude. 

(b) Mathematical perspective. 

§ (3) Forms of Space Apprehension. Each sense 
has its own data for the intuition of space, so that 
apart from its abstract and general meaning it may 
have a concrete meaning for each sense. The 
three prominent senses, however, in the process 
are vision, touch and hearing, and if we admit a 
muscular sense, we may include it among the 
number. 

§ (4) Theories of Space Apprehension. There are 
two classes of theories of this process, one relating 
to the conditions and elements of it and the other 
to the time and origin of it. They should in every 
case be kept distinct from each other. 
1. Theories of its Conditions These refer to the 
process and its elements. 

(a) The Associational Theory. This theory holds 
that the conception of space is a product of 
association either between touch, where space 
is original, and other senses, or between the 
data of all the senses which, taken alone, do 
not give space, but in combination either pro- 
duce a new datum or are the space in ques- 
tion, space being thus resolved in the last case 
into sensational elements. 

(b) The Local Sign Theory. This theory holds 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 63 

that the consciousness of space, definite space, 
is due to certain characteristics in sensations 
by which the locus and relations of objects are 
determined. These signs are either a certain 
quale or quality in the sensation, or a muscu- 
lar sensation accompanying the sensorial data, 
and which indicate the definite quantum of 
extension to consciousness. 

References. Associational Theory. J. Br. C, pp. 345-350; 'Berkeley, Theory 
of Vision; Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, Chapters 
XIII. and XIV.; Bain, Senses and Intellect; Senses, Chapter II.; Touch, §§ 13 
and 14; Sight, §§ 12-16; Intellect, Chapter I., §§ 33-45; Spencer, Psychology, 
Vol. II., pp. 177-207; Ribot, German Psychology of To-Day, pp. 126-134. 

Local Sign Theory. J. Br. C, pp. 345-350; B. Ele., pp. 1 15-120; Ribot, Ger- 
man Psychology of To-Day, pp. 68-104, 199-209; Lotze, Dictata of Psychology, 
Part I., Chapter IV.; id., Kleine Schriften, Vol. III., pp. 372-396, and Revue 
Philosophique, Vol. IV., pp. 345-365; id., Metaphysics (Translation), Bk. III., 
Chapter IV.; Ladd, Out, p. 294.; id., Psy., pp. 141-161. 

On Space Intuition in General. J. Br. C, pp. 335-350; B. Ele., pp. 1 13-123; 
H., pp. 190-205; Ladd, Out., 291-302, 326, 339-343; James, Psy., Vol. II., pp. 
134-283; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 215-226, 237-251, 265-269; Ladd, Psy., 
Chapters XV. and XVI.; Wundt, Human and Animal Psychology (Trans- 
lation), pp. 134-138, 145-148, 149-195; Mind, Vol. XII., pp. 1-30, 183-211, 
321-353. 5 1 6-548; Vol. XIII., pp. 339-355. 499-5 2 °; Vol. XVI. pp. 54-79; 
also Vol. I., p. 284; Vol. III., p. 433; Vol. X., pp. 227, 377, 512; Vol. XL, 
P- 5395 Vol. XV., pp. 305 and 537; Psychological Review, Vol. I., pp. 257-273, 
581-601. 

2. Theories of its Origin. These refer to the 
question whether the idea is natural or acquired, 
native or derived. 

{a) Nativism. This theory holds that space is a 
native percept and in no sense a product of 
experience or association. It is not clear in 
various writers advocating it whether they 
mean definite or indefinite space, or both. It 
is properly tenable only in the perception of 
indefinite space, though there are natural data 
for developing definite space. 



64 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

{b) Empiricism. This theory holds that the con- 
ception of space is derived from experience 
and association, and is in no sense an innate 
idea. It has intended to deny the originality 
of both definite and indefinite space, but is 
properly tenable only in relation to definite 
space, and associated signs and criteria, which 
are adjusted to each other in different senses. 

References. J.Br. C, pp. 346-350; B. Ele., pp. 1 18-122; H., Ont. pp. 201- 
204; Ladd, Out., pp. 302-305, 355-360; id., Psy., pp. 325-327; Sully, H. M., 
Vol. I., pp. 226-228, 256-257; Ribot, German Psychology of To-Day, pp. 96- 
134; Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton's- Philosophy, Chapters XV 
and XVI; Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, Vol. II., pp. 196-209; James, 
Psy., Vol. II., pp. 270-282. 

§ (5) Phenomena Bearing upon Space Apprehen- 
sion and its Theories. There are several 
classes of phenomena which illustrate the process 
of space perception, and which are used to prove 
various theories. 

1. Stereoscopic Vision. These are the phenomena 
of artificial combination of distinct but similar 
images. 

References. Wundt, Human and Animal Psychology, pp. 186-194; Physio- 
logische Psychologie, Vol. II., pp. 172-183. For a large mass of literature on this 
subject, see Helmholtz, Physiologische Optik., pp. 692-695 (First Edition). 

2. Binocular Experiments. These represent ex- 
periments in combination or fusion of geometrical 
figures so as to develop the perception of solidity, 
distance and perspective, where they do not exist 
in the objects. 

References. Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, Vol. II., pp. 149-172; id., 
Beitrage, pp. 263-299; id., Human and Animal Psychology, pp. 1S2-194; Her- 
ing, Beitrage zur Physiology, pp. 81-107; Mind, Vol. XIII., pp. 499-526; 
Psychological Review, Vol. I., pp. 591-601. 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL O G V 



65 



3. Experiments and' Operations with those 
BORN BLIND. Cases of space perception immedi- 
ately after the restoration of sight to those born 
blind seem related to all theories. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 116-119; Hamilton, Lects. on Meta., Lect. XXVII; 
McCosh, Defence of Fundamental Truth, pp. 152-158; Murray, Handbook of 
Psychology, pp. 163-170; Sully, Out. of Psy., Appendix D; id., H. M., Ap- 
pendix B; Mill, Exam, of Sir. W. Hamilton's Philos., Chap. XIII., pp. 284-288; 
Abbott, Sight and Touch. 

III. The Apprehension of Time. Time is often called 
the form of internal, as space is the form of external intui- 
tion. This means that our conception of it is primarily de- 
rived from inner experience, and not from outer experience. 
The perception of an external order of objects takes the form 
of time only when considered as related to the mental world. 
The facts, events or experiences of consciousness appear in 
a time order rather than that of space, time being in reality 
the condition of that order. The theory of the intuition of 
it will depend upon the conception we take of the thing ap- 
prehended. 

§ (1) The Conception of Time. Time as a concep- 
tion is in general the consciousness of succession, but 
its meaning for the psychological theory will de- 
pend upon the same distinction that was made in 
regard to space, that detween definite and indefinite, 
or empirical and a priori time. 

1. Indefinite Time. This is time as a mere sense 
of duration, but without any consciousness of its 
amount in terms of a definite criterion. This is 
its conception as a condition of knowing a se- 
quence or successive order of events at all, and 
cannot be the subject of psychological inquiry, so 
far as its origin and conditions are concerned. 

2. Definite Time. This is time as represented in 



65 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

terms of a fixed datum, or as a distinct interval be- 
tween events likely to occur in an order that is 
regular and perhaps commensurable or associable 
with some other mental phenomenon which makes 
it appear definite and constant. The problem for 
psychology is to find the psychic constant for the 
determination of our definite conceptions of time. 
This does not constitute the general consciousness 
of time, but only the definite amount of it which 
interests the arrangements of life. 
§ (2) Elements and Conditions of Time Apprehen- 
sion. The process is quite as complicated and 
more abstruse in its conception than that of space. 

1. The contents of time cannot be separated from the 
consciousness of it. Our notion of definite time 
cannot be dissociated from the events which 
measure it. 

2. The amount of time felt or perceived depends upon 
the number of discrete or distinct units of experi- 
ence in which consciousness or attention may be 
interested as they occur. 

3. The psychic constant for the sense of time is some 
regular but recurrent phenomenon which offers a 
more or less fixed interval between the numbers of 
its series, by which to measure the 7. neral lapse 
of time in other events. This seems to be best in 
the rythmic events of sound. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 280-286; B. Ele., pp. 152-159; H. Out., pp. 184- 
192; Sully, H. M., Vol. L, pp. 3 18-330; James. Psy., Vol. I., pp. 605-643; 
Ladd. Psy., pp. 495-499. 



CHAPTER VII. 

MEMORY. 

I. General Characteristics. Memory is often a general, 
and sometimes a technical term. But the broader meaning 
is conditioned by the narrower, so that its full import must 
depend upon definition and analysis. 

§ ( i ) Definition of Memory. The most comprehen- 
sive meaning of the term denotes the conservative 
capacities of the mind, or all those functions con- 
nected with the preservation, recall and knowledge 
of past experiences. The technical meaning fluc- 
tuates between the retention and the recognition of 
past impressions. But as retention has no mean- 
ing for the mind unless recognition accompanies it, 
and as the latter is not possible without the former, 
memory should be considered as the power to pre- 
serve and to reperceive the mind's own past ex- 
perience. The single term reperception, with its 
conditions and implications, might be adopted as 
the equivalent of memory. 
§ • (2) Elements of Memory. Recognition of the past 
depends upon its having once been a present ex- 
perience, and its preservation and recall in some 
way, so that these conditions have to be recognized, 
recall or association being intermediate between 
the two processes. Then the act of recognition 
must be completed by two processes, representa- 
tion and the perception of relative position occu- 
(67) 



68 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

pied by individual experiences as they occurred. 
The elements conditioning and completing the 
most important part of memory, which is recogni- 
tion, are, therefore, as follows : 

1. Retention. This is the simple preservation of 
impressions or their effects. 

2. Reproduction or Association. This is the re- 
call of past impressions, due to some connecting 
link between past and present. 

3. Recognition. This is the cognition of an event 
as a past experience of the subject. It is distinct- 
ively the reperceptive process. 

4. Representation or Imagination. This is the 
reimaging of the past, a process which gives sen- 
sory meaning to that of recognition. 

5. Reposition or Localization. This completes 
the process of recognition by assigning the place 
of the representation in the whole of past experi- 
ence. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 128-133; H. Out., 121-144; Ladd, Out., p. 419; Ham- 
ilton, Lects. on Meta., Lect. XXX; Ladd, Psy., pp. 381-387. 

II. Retention and its Phenomena. Retention does not 
express a process, but only the fact that past experience is 
not wholly lost and is somehow kept within the possible 
reach of consciousness under its proper laws. Its analogy 
is found in the persistence of impressions upon physical ob- 
jects, and hence it represents what subsists below conscious- 
ness. 

§ (1) The Compass of Retention. By the compass 
of retention we mean the number of impressions 
that are kept within the reach of possible recall. 
The probability is that absolutely every impres- 
sion ever made upon the sensorium is recorded 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



6 9 



and available for consciousness, though they may 
not all be immediately recognizable as belonging 
to the subject's past. 

References. Hamilton, Lects. on Meta., Lects. XVIII, first half, and XXX, last 
paragraph; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, Chapter X., pp. 429-470 ; Chapter 
XIII., pp. 515-543; Taine, On Intelligence, Vol. I., pp. 75-78; Proceedings of 
the Society for Psychical Research, Vol. VIII., pp. 488-494; James, Psy., Vol. 
I., pp. 681-687. 

§ (2) Theories of Retention. The methods of ex- 
plaining retention have often identified it with 
memory, or have used the latter term in its nar- 
rower sense. But they have all sought more or 
less to find analogies in physical phenomena. 
This may be legitimate for retention, but not for 
recognition, where it is not persistence, but con- 
sciousness of the past that is to be explained. The 
theories, such as they are, are as follows : 

1. Metaphorical Explanations. In these reten- 
tion or memory is compared with a wax tablet, or 
a storehouse. 

2. Physiological Theory. This theory explains 
the phenomenon by the plastic character of the 
brain and the number of its cells. 

3. Psychological Theory. This view explains 
retention by the peculiar characteristics of. mind 
which distinguish it from matter, and refers it, one 
form of the doctrine to habit, and the other to 
subliminal mental action. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 287-292; B. Ele., pp. 134-143; Ladd, Out., pp. 
419-424; Psy., pp. 383-387; James, Psy., Vol. I., pp. 653-659; Sully, H. M., 
Vol. I., pp. 186-187; Hamilton, Lects. on Meta., Lect. XXX. 

III. Reproduction or Association. Reproduction is the 
recall of past experiences, the resurrection of them from the 
unconscious or from their latent position in the brain cells. 



y SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

This is due to some connection between present and past 

mental states. 

§ ( i ) Nature of Association. Association generally 
means "binding together," and may apply to any 
synthesis or integration of mental phenomena. 
But in connection with memory it is properly the 
name of a connection between the present and the 
past, and not the name of a conscious state. The 
consciousness of the result and of that connection 
is subsequent to the act of reproduction, which is 
a purely subconscious act. Its characteristics are 
several. 
i. A quality about present states attracting the past 
and connecting it with the present. 

2. A quality about past experiences making them 
revivable. 

3. Relations of interest and attention between both 
classes of ideas. 

4. Accompaniment of selection and dissociation in 
regard to certain elements of experience. 

§ (2) Laws and Conditions of Association. The 
laws of association formulate the principles upon 
which present and past experiences are connected 
by reproduction. They are divided into Primary 
and Secondary laws. 
I. PRIMARY LAWS. The primary laws of association 
are those which represent the most frequent and 
natural connection between the past and present. 
They are represented by similarity and contiguity, 
(a) Law of Similarity . Resemblances between 

mental states, or objects, tend to recall or to 

associate the experiences constituting them. 

This similarity takes two forms, subjective and 

objective. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



n 



For Objective Similarity the law is : Objects 
that resembling each other tend to be associated 
in the process of experience. If this resem- 
blance be in essential qualities the process 
gives rise to scientific classification ; if it be in 
accidental qualities it gives rise to the fluctu- 
ating and unstable conceptions of common life. 
For Subjective Similarity the law is : Men- 
tal states, intellectual or emotional, resembling 
each other, tend to be associated, and .with 
them the objects that produced them. This 
law explains the capricious character of many 
associated series and the essentially unrelated 
nature of many objects so recalled. 
(b) Law of Contiguity. Phenomena that are in 
some way contiguous to each other tend to be 
recalled together. There are two forms of 
this law, Contiguity in Space and Contiguity in 
Time. It may also have both a subjective 
and an objective application, inasmuch as 
the contiguity may be of external objects 
and events, and of mental phenomena. 
2. Secondary Laws. The secondary laws represent 
connections between past and present that are 
either less frequent or less constant and necessary 
as associations. They are probably modifications 
of primary laws, those of similarity especially, due 
to subjective causes. The main principle is prob- 
ably mental momentum, giving subjective similar- 
ity where it would not occur spontaneously as a 
result of impressions from objects. They are 
largely the expression of mental interest. There 
are four of these laws. 
(«) Frequency. Phenomena that have frequently 



72 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCLIOLOGY 



3- 



been in experience tend to be recalled without 
regard to essential connection with present 
mental states. 
(&) Recency. Events that are recent have a greater 
tendency to recall than those that are remote, 
other things being equal, being affected both 
by the law of contiguity and subjective simi- 
larity. 

(c) Intensity. Experiences that have been nota- 
ble for their intensity of interest and feeling, 
whether near or remote, tend to frequent re- 
call. 

(d) Interest. The fact that certain objects or 
events have had an interest for the subject 
tends to promote their ready recall. 

Tabular Summary . The laws of association may 
be outlined as follows : 



Primary. 



r Objective. Similarity of things. 

■*' \ Subjective. Similariiy of feelings. 

In Space. Objective. 

Contiguity. \ Subjective. 
In Time. 



(. Objective 
I Frequency = Habit. 
Secondary. \ Recency = Contiguity in time. 
| Intensity = Emphasis. 
L Interest = Attention. 



References. J. Br. C, pp. 253-279; B. Ele., pp. 162-174; H. Out., pp. 152- 
164; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 185-198, 294-316; James, Psy., Vol. I., pp. 550- 
594; Ladd, Psy., pp. 263-291 ; Bain, Senses and Intellect, The Intellect, Chapter 
II., Section 1-33; Hamilton, Lects. on Meta., Lects. XXXI and XXXII. 

§ (3) Unification of the Laws of Association. 
The laws of mental connection between past and 
present can be reduced to a single principle called 
Redintegration. It is formulated as follows : 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



73 



When any part of a totality occurs or is recalled 
the total tends to be reproduced. This law com- 
bines in one act the principles of Similarity and 
Contiguity, and especially explains the operation 
of the secondary laws. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 168-169; Hamilton, Lects. on Meta., Lect. XXXII; 
Bain, Senses and Intellect, The Intellect, Chapter I., Section 1. 

§ (4) Complex Associations. These are a series, or 
are groups of facts which are connected into wholes 
by the combined influence of different laws. 
There are three forms of them : 

1. Divergent Association. This tendency repre- 
sents the disposition of the mind to diverge into a 
number of connected objects on the basis of sev- 
eral laws. Their operation may be simultaneous 
or successive. It is caused by relaxation or dis- 
persion of attention. 

2. Convergent Association. This tendency repre- 
sents the combination of several laws to the same 
end, in which one element of a previous con- 
sciousness is recalled by its simultaneous or suc- 
cessive connection with several others. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 173-174; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 338-344; id., 
Outlines, pp. 272-275. 

3. Law of Contrast. This law expresses the fact 
that certain conceptions tend to recall their op- 
posites to consciousness. The law is sometimes 
made a simple one and opposed to similarity, but 
it is in reality a complex law involving three 
factors. 

(#) Subjective Contiguity, or the contiguous con- 
nection of the conceptions in consciousness, as 
found in the process of discrimination. 



74 -S" YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

(b) Subjective Similarity, or the resemblance of 
mental states involving the consciousness of a 
part of a whole, of which part the contrasted 
conception is the complement. 

(c) The Law of Frequency, or the tendency to re- 
currence of conceptions that are often con- 
nected in experience. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 166-167; Murray, Handbook of Psychology, pp. 86- 
88; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 336-338; Bain, Senses and Intellect, The Intellect, 
Chapter III., Sections 18-21. 

§ (5) Interest and Association. Interest in the 
phenomena, objects, or experiences recalled is an 
important influence upon their reproduction. It is, 
perhaps, the only condition of recalling what is 
wanted, though it may not be infallible in its 
action. The effects of interest are : 

1 . SELECTION. Interest shows a marked tendency to 
select particular objects or events from the past 
for recall. It is simply the momentum of attention 
which affects the susceptibility to recall, as well as 
the intensity of a particular element in the present 
manifold. 

2. Unity. The process of selection and the concen- 
tration of consciousness about a single thread of 
interest gives unity of character and purpose to 
the mental life. 

3. Economy. Interest effects economy of time and 
energy in recalling what is important for the in- 
dividual's life and adjustment, as well as develop- 
ment in the direction desired. 

4. Utility. The advantage to life from the effect of 
interest upon association is proportioned to the 
degree of selection, unity and economy effected by 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



75 



it in promoting development and conferring in- 
creased power of mind over knowledge and events. 
References. B. Ele., p. 170. D. Psy., pp. 111-117. 

§ (6) Dissociation. Dissociation is the disintegration 
of those compounds which have been formed by 
association. It is mainly the phenomenon of ob- 
liviscence, which is the dropping into the back- 
ground of certain elements of a connected group 
or series and the retention of only the important 
features for recall, if any are retained at all. Con- 
sequently, it is the process opposite to association. 
It is determined by several of the secondary influ- 
ences in association, which divert interest from 
certain factors of consciousness while concentrat- 
ing it upon others. These influences are : 

1. ATTENTION. Attention has the effect of sup- 
pressing interest and notice of the elements in the 
indirect field of consciousness, and weakening their 
cohesion with the rest, which affects their suscep- 
tibility to recall. 

2. Selection. Attention and interest are a means of 
selection, but this selection tends to separate 
some elements from others and to consign the 
less important to oblivion, from which they can- 
not be recalled. 

Attention and selection are the law of natural 
selection and the survival of the fittest applied to 
consciousness. 

3. Economy. The tendency to economy of mental 
energy expresses itself in the suppression of un- 
essential and the strengthening of the essential 
elements of experience — essential, of course, to a 
given end. 

-References. D., Psy., pp. 1 17-132. 



yfi SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

§ (7) Influence of Association. Association is one 
of the most important factors of mental life in its 
effects upon both knowledge and conduct. 

1. The Formative Principle in Conception. In 
so far as a conception denotes the synthesis of 
qualities which make a whole, singular or general, 
association is a necessary factor in its formation. 

2. The Basis of Habit. Association of present 
with past interests and the means to their satisfac- 
tion determines impulses to the formation of 
habits, until they become lines of least resistance. 

3. The Condition of Adjustment. The relation 
or connection between the past and future with the 
present is such that prudent adjustment to time 
would be impossible without memory and associa- 
tion. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 279, 134-150; D. Psy., pp. 111-117. 

IV. Recognition, or Memory Proper. The act of recog- 
nition is the most essential of memory as a whole, because 
retention as latent impression or memory potential, and re- 
production as automatism, may occur without any conscious- 
ness of their relation to the subject's past. Without this 
consciousness of their relation the idea is only a new presen- 
tation as known, and with consciousness of this relation, it is 
memory. 

§ (1) Nature of Recognition. Recognition is the 
perception of a state as a reproduced past exper- 
ence, or of the connection between a present and 
a past event. Unless this element of time rela- 
tion enters, it is not a recognition. 
§ (2) Conditions of Recognition. These must not 
be confused with the conditions of memory in the 
broad sense, though they will be found among 
them. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY nj 

i. Predominance of Reproduction. If the re- 
produced element in a present idea be incidental 
and disproportioned to the whole, the probability 
of recognition is weakened. 

2. Interest in the Past. Without an interest in 
the past it may be recalled, but not recognized, 
this interest serving to give intensity to the repro- 
duced element. 

3. Developed Discriminativeness. Unless temp- 
oral discriminativeness be clear, recognition will be 
defective for the lack of ability to distinguish be- 
tween presentation and representation. 

Refei'eiices. J. Br. C, pp. 287-301 ; B. Ele. pp. 149-159; Ladd. Out., pp. 428- 
-429; id, Psy. pp. 397-402. 

V. Representation or Imagination. Representation or 
imagination is a presentation of the past more or less in the 
form of its original occurrence, but generally with less dis- 
tinctness than in the past, especially when the experience 
was sensory. Under certain conditions it may take the form 
■of a hallucination, though distinguished from reality. 

§ (1) Meaning of Imagination. The term has two 
meanings, which in reality distinguish two kinds of 
the power expressed by the term. 

1. Imagination as a reimaging power or representa- 
tion of the past in its proper relations. 

2. Imagination as a formative power arranging con- 
ceptions in an original order and constructing 
ideal objects as opposed to the real. 

§ (2) The Basis of Imagination. The conditions 
upon which the representative act is based are 
partly organic and partly experiential. The de- 
gree of its development rests upon the latter fac- 
tor. These conditions are : 



j g S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

i. The Connection Between the Sensory ani> 
the Intellectual Centres. If the associative 
tracts between them are constructed or act so that 
ideas can influence the sensory centres, the im- 
agination will be distinct in the same proportion. 

2. The Matter of Past Experience. The imagi- 
nation in both the passive and the active forms is 
based upon experience, no matter independent of 
this being utilizable, though the result appears 
new. 

3. The Quantity of Experience. The amount of 
experience possessed by the subject and its re- 
call very greatly determine the extent to which 
imagination acts either representatively or con- 
structively. 

§ (3) Forms of the Imagination. The kinds of im- 
agination are based partly upon its object matter 
and partly upon the mode of the process, two 
kinds being determined by one, and two kinds by 
the other. 

1. Reproductive Imagination. This simply re- 
produces and represents the past as it was in real- 
ity, and does not modify it in its form or contents. 

2. Constructive Imagination. This is the modi- 
fication of representation, or the construction of 
fictitious products out of past experience or the 
elements of them after analyzing them. 

3. Sensorial Imagination. This is the power or 
tendency to think in sensory images, and varies 
with different powers in the same person. 

When connected with the emotions it is the 
basis of aesthetic art. 

4. Intellectual Imagination. This is the more 
abstract use of imagination, and though it is not 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



79 



wholly free from sensorial connections and 
imagery, it is less clear and definite in this re- 
spect. 

Its principal object is scientific and philosophic 
constructions connected with theories and hypo- 
theses. 
References. J. Br. C, pp. 302-311; B. Ele., pp. 175-191; D. Psy., pp. 192-201; 
Ladd. Psy., pp. 408-427; Sully H. M. Vol. I., pp. 278-289, 362-387. Brain, 
Senses and Intellect, The Intellect, chapter iv, James Psy., Vol. II, pp. 44-76. 

VI. Reposition or Localization. The act of memory is 
not complete until the event recalled and recognized is prop- 
erly localized in time ; that is, represented in relation to the 
events with which it helped to constitute a whole. Local- 
ization in memory, therefore, does for mental states in time 
what localization of objects does for perceptions in space. 
Localization does for recognition what contiguity does for 
reproduction, and may be said to be one form of it. The 
process has several conditions. 

§.(1) Conditions of Localization. The conditions 
of the phenomenon are mental data and laws 
which determine the accuracy of the localization in 
time. They are : 

1 . Sense of Time Distance. This is the general feel- 
ing of the amount of time elapsed between present 
and represented events. 

2. The Extent of Redintegration. A most important 
factor in localization is the extent to which con- 
tiguity operates in recalling associated events. 

3. The Sense of Succession. The general conscious- 
ness of succession and the relation of all past ex 
periences affects the definiteness of localization. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 152-160; Ladd. Psy., p. 402-407. 

§ (2) Secondary Influences on Localization. 



g S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

These are the various forms of experience affect- 
ing the consciousness of duration or the distinct- 
iveness of the event in the series representing the 
time continuum of the mind. 

1. Intensity. Through its influence on association 
intensity effects localization. 

2. Attention. The occupation of attention shortens 
the sense of time, and the absence of it lengthens 
the feeling of time. 

3. Number. Rapidity and number of experiences 
give the sense of slowly elapsing time. 

References. B. Ele., pp., 154-156. 

VIII. Problems of Memory as a Whole. There are 
several problems which are connected rather with memory 
in its comprehensive sense than with any one element of it 
and should be discussed separately. They are : 

§ (1) Obliviscence. Obliviscence is not defective re- 
tention, but defective power of reproduction and 
recognition. The causes of the phenomenon are : 

1. Dissociation. This eliminates the influence of con- 
tiguity in recall. 

2. Dispersed Attention. This prevents that degree of 
apperception which gives cohesiveness and interest 
to experience. 

3. Defective Intensity. This prevents attention and 
interest which are so necessary to memory. 

4. Hypnotic Trance. This cuts off nearly all connec- 
tion between the normal and the hypnotic stream 
of consciousness. The reproductive process may 
be retained, but the recognitive is wholly elimi- 
nated, with possibly only a few exceptions. 

5. Disease and Accident. These may go so far as to 
produce the same effect as the hypnotic trance, or 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 8 1 

they may only partially destroy memory, repro- 
duction and recognition. Common aphasia. 
6. Old Age. The effect in this case comes partly 
from physical conditions and partly from declin- 
ing mental power and interest. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 300-301 ; Ladd, Out., p. 425 ; James. Psy, Vol. I., pp. 
679-687; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 350-353; Taine. On Intelligence, Vol. I., pp. 
90-99; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, pp. 442-448, 460-465. 

§ (2) Illusions of Memory. Illusions of memory are 
variously mistakes of recognition and localization, 
the error being analogous to illusions of percep- 
tion. They are quite frequent in unimportant mat- 
ters, but less frequent in the important. The 
causes of these illusions are as follows : 

1 . Mistaken Identity. A present and a past ex- 
perience may be identified by confusing subjective 
with objective similarity. 

2. OBLIVISCENCE. Forgetfulness of certain details 
of a whole may give rise to a feeling of identity 
between past and present that does not exist. 

3. Imperfect Redintegration. This is practically 
the same as obliviscence and produces the same 
effect. 

4. Translocation. Imperfect recall may give rise 
to the translocation of an experience to a point in 
the mental series to which it does not belong. 

5. Mental Aberration. Certain forms of insanity 

give rise to pseudo-presentiments, or hallucinations 

of a past which did not exist. 

References. Sully, Illusions, chap. X; Dugald Stewart, Works, Vol. II., pp. 
356-364; Mind, Vol. XIII., pp. 244-248, 415-417; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, 
pp. 456-459; Lewes, (G. H.), Problems of Life and Mind, Third Series, II., 
Chapter IX; Memory, pp, 112-121; Scribner's Magazine, Vol. XI, pp. 185-195. 

§ (3) Education of Memory. The general principle 



g 2 S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

of education for the memory is that of strengthen- 
ing the associative powers, and is called the art of 
mnemonics. This art has to rely mainly upon 
cultivating the secondary principles of association, 
which are the principal influences in the prevention 
of obliviscence. The means for this cultivation 
are : 
i. Creation of Interest. The most important of 
all the influences upon memory is an interest in 
the fact to be remembered, and this interest must 
be constant rather than momentary. 

2. Persistence of Attention. The persistency 
and even existence of attention are selective in na- 
ture and a source of emphasis to the facts to be^ 
remembered, saving energy for memory that 
would otherwise be scattered. 

3. Repetition. This gives both intensity and fre- 
quency as instruments of reproduction, and uti- 
lizes the preceding principles. 

4. Systematization. The arrangement of facts in 
an order, preferably a logical and scientific order, 
utilizes both interest and attention while it 
strengthens the influence of similarity and conti- 
guity. 

These several processes involve a condemna- 
tion of artificial systems of mnemonics which bur- 
den the mind with unnecessary details, while the 
good accomplished by them comes wholly from 
the interest and attention aroused, but not used 
scientifically. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 298-299; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 358-361 ; James, 
Psy., Vol. I., pp. 665-670; Ladd, Psy., pp., 405-407; Encyclopedia Britannica, 
Article, Mnemonics; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, pp. 469-470, Kay, Memory. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THOUGHT OR IDEATION. 

I. General Nature of Thought. ' Uses of the term. 
Ideation serves as a technical meaning for the conception of 
thought as a reflective process of elaboration. It here de- 
notes all the higher acts of intellect which are connected 
with the systematization of experience. Sensation, cognition, 
association, recognition and thought compared. Order, of 
dependence and relation to each other. 

§ (i) Definition of Thought. Thought, as an 
ideational process, is that act of mind which cog- 
nizes the relation between things and phenomena. 
Apprehension cognizes individual facts, thought 
cognizes their relations to each other and unifies 
knowledge. 
§ (2) Elements of Thought. The elements of 
thought are the processes which either constitute it 
or are implied by it. 

1. Discrimination. This is the act of distinguish- 
ing between objects of consciousness or elements 
of a manifold presented to it. It involves atten- 
tion, selection and the preception of differences. 
It is an act of analysis. 

2. Unification. This is the complement of discrimi- 
nation, and is the act of synthesis, or conception 
and combination of elements to form a whole of 
some kind, which may be an individual, or class 
whole, a proposition or complex reasoning. 

(83) 



84 S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

§ (3) Divisions of Thought. The divisions of 
thought are those processes of higher mental ac- 
tion which, though they are, as acts of conscious- 
ness, the same in kind, are distinguished by the 
object matter to which they are applied. 

1. COGNITION.* This is the act by which we become 
aware of objects comprising a synthesis of quali- 
ties. 

2. Conception. This is the act by which we form 
general and abstract notions. 

3. Judgment. This is the act by which we form 
propositions. 

4. Reasoning. This is the act by which we infer 
certain real or supposed truths from given data. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 205, 206; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 388-413; Hamil- 
ton, Lects. on Meta., Lect. XXXIV, id. Lects. on Logic, Lect. I. 

II. Cognition. Current usage and the fact that the 
knowledge of objects constituted by a complex of qualities 
is synthetic, have distinguished this term from the mere con- 
sciousness of an individual fact or experience, and psychology 
has adopted the notion of its complexity so widely, though 
aware that it is generally confused with what we have called 
intuition, that it is best to retain the term for that act by 

* Cognition is here classed under thought power because I find it necessary to 
draw a radical distinction between two uses of the term. First, it is used to de- 
note the apprehension of a simple or single quality like a color, a sound, density 
or hardness, form, etc. Second, it is used to denote the consciousness of an ob- 
ject which is a synthesis of a number of qualities, not all appealing probably to the 
same sense. In this last sense association and thought are involved. . Intuition or 
apprehension might be adopted for the former, and then we can limit perception 
or cognition to the latter, so as not to introduce any innovation in the use of the 
term " conception." Moreover it will enable us to conform to the usage that dis- 
tinguishes between the origin of our idea of individual and that of class wholes. 
It will have considerable importance for the theories of knowledge, both in re- 
gard to its genesis and its nature. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 85 

which we get the idea of a single complex whole. This act 
involves the higher operations of the mind. The act is very 
closely connected with intuition or apprehension, and in 
mature experience can hardly be distinguished from it, be- 
cause the two will go together. 

The term cognition etymologically imports the synthetic 
character of the act as it is, and is here used to comprehend 
all the actions at the basis of the several functions connected 
with the formation of complex ideas, conception, judgment 
and reasoning. 

§ (1) Definition of Cognition. Cognition is that 
synthetic act of mind by which we form the notion 
of a complex or attribute whole. It is the con- 
sciousness of unity as possessed by the group of 
qualities making an individual object. 
§ (2) Divisions of Cognition. There are three forms 
of cognition according as the object is concrete, 
abstract, or ideal. 

1. Perception. Perception is the act of cognition 
which unifies experience or the manifold of sense 
in space and time. The result is a percept which 
will represent an attribute whole, as Plato, Bis- 
marck, Gladstone, and concrete general terms. 
The law determining it is the coexistence of differ- 
ent qualities in the same subject. The mental act 
is represented in the unity of consciousness. The 
forms of it are : 

(a) External Perception. External perception is 

the act of unifying the experiences of sense, 

apprehension, or intuition. 
($) Internal Perception. Internal perception is the 

unifying of the manifold of self-consciousness, 

as given in internal experience. 

2. Apperception. This process is the cognition of 



86 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

meaning, relation or connection affecting the 
meaning of a fact. It is usually connected with an 
act of attention, but always denotes the conscious- 
ness of identity, relation or causal connection ex- 
plaining events. It makes use of similarity and 
necessary connection as perception makes use of 
contiguity and coexistence in the formation of 
wholes. The process is the first step of concep- 
tion, and is assimilative as well as synthetic in its 
nature. Thus to see an object which is a table is 
to perceive it ; to see that it is a table is to apper- 
ceive it. It is dependent upon association to a 
larger degree than perception. 
3. Preperception. Preperception is the act of mind 
which anticipates and distorts the appearance of 
stimulus and impressions. It is a common effect 
of association and may result from apperception. 
It may so modify or determine what is seen that 
the object of consciousness becomes illusory. Pre- 
occupation of attention and imagination are the 
main factors of its influence. It is the basis of 
illusions and hallucinations, as apperception is that 
of conception. Hence it is constructive or creative 
in its nature. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 312-317, 326, 232-236; B. Ele., pp. m-114; H., 
Out., pp. 121-130; Ladd, Out., pp. 290-295; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 206-215; 
James, Psy., Vol. II., pp. 76-85, 107-111. Vol. I., pp. 438-447; Wundt, Human 
and Animal Psychology (Translation), pp. 244-248. 

§ (3) Objects of Perception. These are the same as 
in apprehension, except that in perception they 
represent aggregates of qualities instead of individ- 
ual properties and events. 
1. Space. Space as an object of perception is a syn- 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



87 



thesis of all the data having that relation in each 
sense. 

2. Time. Time is the complex conception of all the 
facts involved in the consciousness of duration. 

3. Reality. Reality is the unity of events and phe- 
nomena in a subject, which is objective if applied 
to external perception, but subjective if applied to 
internal perception. 

III. Pseudo-Perception. This is the process of percep- 
tion minus the corresponding objects and their localization 
as they appear in normal experience, and in some cases it 
represents mental or cerebral action wholly outside the nor- 
mal stream of consciousness. There are three general classes 
of pseudo-perceptions to be considered. They are Illusions, 
Hallucinations, and the pseudo-cognitions of Sleep and 
Hypnosis, which merge into each other as also do illusions 
and hallucinations. The third class may be called Hypno- 
psychoses. 

§ (1) ILLUSIONS. Illusions are false perceptions which 
arise from a wrong interpretation of the data of 
knowledge. They involve the function of apper- 
ception with some influence from preperception, 
and are not inconsistent with a normal condition 
of mind. They may be called hermeneutic errors 
in perception, owing to the fact that they are mis- 
takes of the interpretive functions of conscious- 
ness. 
1. Divisions of Illusions. In the broad sense 
they cover every form of error due to misinterpre- 
tation, though the term more technically denotes 
those of sense. But in its more comprehensive 
meaning there are two classes of them. 
(«) Sensory Illusions. These are illusions proper, 



] SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

and are due to a false interpretation of sense 
impressions, and they represent mistaken 
reality. 
($) Intellectual Illusions. These are errors of in- 
tellectual interpretation and include errors of 
jtidgment, and errors of reasoning (Fallacies). 
2. Causes OF ILLUSIONS. In general these are both 
extra-organic and intra- organic, the former being 
the instigating cause, and the latter the supple- 
mentary influence. The extra-organic are in- 
cluded because the phenomenon would not be 
called an illusion without them. Most of them 
apply only to sensory illusions. 
(a) Extra-organic Stimulus. This is the appro- 
priate external influence affecting the sense 
and brain center involved in the illusion. 
(<5>) Intra-organic Conditions. These are partly 
sensory and partly intellectual. 

f Variations of discriminative sensibility. 

■ Variations in the duration of impressions. 
Limitations of Sensibility \ T7 . . . . ., . , , 

J I Variations in the intensity of sensations. 

(_ Variations in the compass of attention. 

(Anaesthesia = Depression of sensibility. 
Hyperaesthesia — Exaltation of sensibility. 
Parsesthesia = Imperfect sensibility, 
f Apperception. 

| Preperception. 
Intellectual Disturbances \ . • .- 

[_ Inference. 

Two of these apply only to sense illusions, 
and the last class applies equally to both sen- 
sory and intellectual illusions, and will be 
more intimately connected with normal ex- 
perience. 
References. J. Br. C, pp. 317-326; B. Ele., pp. 192-201; H. Out., pp. 144- 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



8 9 



148; James, Psy., Vol. II., pp. 85-107, 243-268; Sully, H. M., Vol. II., p. 312; 
also see work by same author entitled Illusions; Murray, Handbook of Psy- 
chology, pp. 247-256; Carpenter, Mental Psysiology, pp. 206-209; Taine, On 
Intelligence, Vol. I., pp. 219-266. 

§ (2) HALLUCINATIONS. These are mental construc- 
tions and projections either not clue to stimulus or 
due to a stimulus which does not correspond to 
the sense or brain center affected, but a stimulus 
from some point, of which the hallucination is no 
indicator. They are indices usually of abnormal 
conditions, and represent preperception pure and 
simple, at least in so far as they are constructive 
in their origin. 

1. Divisions of Hallucinations. There are two 
general classes, according as they are sensory or 
intellectual. 

{a) Sensory = Hallucinations proper, or Phan- 
tasms, which may be either subjective or verid- 
ical, according as they are pure creations of 
the brain that has them or are received in 
some mysterious way from without. 

(b) Intellectual = Delusions, which are fixed and 
predominant ideas, and may be called mo- 
noidesms. They vary from insistent to per- 
sistent ideas. 

2. Causes of Hallucinations. The causes of hal- 
lucinations depend upon the kind of phenomenon 
occurring. The cause is usually intra-organic, but 
may also be extra-organic. Subjective hallucina- 
tions may be caused by either internal or external 
influences, and veridical by external only. These 
causes are : — 

(a) Organic Disturbances. These are such as dis- 
ease, lesions, and various forms of pressure 



g Q SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

upon peripheral or central portions of the 
nervous system. In this way we may account 
for hallucinations by stimulus, though it is not 
representative of the object apparently per- 
ceived. 

(b) Hypnotic Suggestion. This is an extra-organic 
cause, and is also mental in its nature, except 
so far as the stimulus must be conveyed 
through the senses. But it operates upon 
mental laws and comes from a mental source. 

(c) Telepathic Impressions. If telepathy be ac- 
cepted as a fact, it will account for certain 
hallucinations having an external cause capa- 
ble of affecting the subject independently of 
the ordinary channels of sense. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 330-334, 207; B. Ele., p. 200; James, Psy., Vol. II., 
pp. 1 14-129; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., p. 284; Ladd, Psy., p. 370; Carpenter, Mental 
Physiology, pp. 165-168; Mind,Vo\. X., pp. 161 and 316; Vol. XIII., pp. 244 
and 415; Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, Vol. III., pp. 151- 
189; Vol. V., pp. 293-310; Vol. X., pp. 25-426; Taine on Intelligence, Vol. I., 
Chapter I., Sections 3 and 14, pp 44-64. 

§ (3) HYPNO-PSYCHOSES. This class of pseudo-percep- 
tions are so denominated because they are some- 
what allied in their nature, and are also allied to 
hallucinations, except that they are not demon- 
strably abnormal. They are closely affiliated with 
the phenomena of sleep, and no absolute dividing 
line can be drawn between the two classes of them. 
They agree in the fact that their mental states are 
purely subjective phenomena (with some possible 
exceptions). 
1. Dreams. Dreams are phantasms or images that 
are caused either by spontaneous mental action, 
waking or sleeping, or by some intra-organic 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



91 



stimulus like that of hallucinations. They are a 
species of normal automatism, but represent con- 
scious phenomena usually minus the sense of in- 
congruity and of the person's real locus. They are 
usually taken for real until compared with the 
events of the waking stream of consciousness. 
The sense of personal identity remains, or at least 
the condition of that judgment. 

References. Sully, H. M., Vol. I., p. 352, Vol. II., pp. 313-315; Murray, 
Handbook of Psychology, pp. 256-266; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, pp. 584- 
591, 157, 165, 171; Ladd, Psy., pp. 412-414; Wundt, Human and Animal Psy- 
chology, pp. 323-327; Physiologische Psychologie, Vol. II., pp. 439-449. 

2. Hypnosis. This may be called artificially, some- 
times spontaneously, induced sleep, or a suspen- 
sion of ordinary consciousness, which may never- 
theless permit mental operations to go on reflect- 
ing all the laws of mind, except that the events 
and experiences thus occurring are not connected 
by memory with the normal stream of conscious- 
ness. The phenomenon is distinguished from 
dreams by just this fact, that it has no definite con- 
nection with the normal personality of the waking 
life, and its experiences cannot be recalled or re- 
membered, except in occasional instances. What- 
ever mental action goes on is purely subliminal 
or subconsious. 

References. Carpenter, Mental Physiology, pp. 591-610, 618-625; Sully, H. 
M., Vol. II., pp. 316-319; James, Psy., Vol. I., p. 407, Vol. II., pp. 128, 351, 594- 
616; Murray, Handbook of Psychology, pp. 266-282; Binet and Fere, Animal 
Magnetism; Moll, Hypnotism and Der Rapport in der Hypnose; Kraft-Ebing, 
Hypnotism; Vincent, Elements ot Hypnotism; Wundt, Human and Animal 
Psychology, pp. 328-339; Physiologische Psychologie, Vol. II., pp. 449-458; Pro- 
ceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, Vol. II., pp. 12-24, 265-292, Vol. 
III., pp. 401-424, 453-459. There are also numerous references in the index 
of later volumes. 



92 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



IV. The Theories of Perception. The so-called theories 
of perception relate to the cognition of things as distinct 
from space and time, or the perception of external reality. 
There are two general theories. 

§ (i) REALISM. This class of theories affirms that con- 
sciousness is capable of arriving at a knowledge of 
things external to the mind. But they divide into 
two schools, according as this knowledge is imme- 
diate or mediate. 
i. Natural Realism. This view may also be 
called naive or representative realism, and main- 
tains that the mind has a direct, intuitive and 
irresolvable knowledge, both of the fact and of 
the nature of external reality. It takes all sensa- 
tions and perceptions as representing this reality. 
2. Hypothetical Realism. This view maintains 
that external reality exists, but is inferred from 
the mode in which it affects the mind, and that 
these modes or sensations are not representative of 
the nature of reality. It differs from naive realism 
in denying that experience represents or gives the 
nature of its external causes, but agrees with it in 
affirming an intuitive knowledge of the fact or 
existence of that reality. 
§ (2) IDEALISM. This class of theories either limits 
knowledge or perception to mental states, or 
affirms that all that is known must be known in 
terms of consciousness, so that external reality is 
either not known at all, or only indirectly known. 
This theory also takes two forms. 
1. Subjective Idealism. This is sometimes called 
psychological idealism, as being the view which is 
based upon the opposition between sensation and 
reality, or the non-representative nature of per- 



S YLLA BUS OF PS YCHOL OGY 



93 



ception. It differs little from hypothetical realism, 
except that it inclines more to a spiritualistic than 
a materialistic view of the world. Besides, it em- 
phasizes the limitations of direct knowledge to 
states of consciousness, and maintains an antithesis 
between consciousness and reality. 
2. Objective Idealism. This may be called on- 
tological idealism, as being the view that all knowl- 
edge is of mental events, and that there is no such 
antithesis between thought and reality as to justify 
the supposition that the external world is anything 
more than consciousness, or the effect of con- 
sciousness. 

References. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. 21-27; Hoffding, 
Outlines of Psychology, pp. 205-221. 

V. Cor ception. Conception is a process that deals with 
the results of perception, and uses apperception as its main 
instrument. Consequently it is a step higher in the mental 
activities of the mind, and results in a somewhat different 
product. It also involves processes not prominent or not 
present in perception. 

§ ( 1 ) Definition of Conception. Conception is that 
act of cognition which forms an abstract general 
notion by observing the similarity and essentially 
common qualities of percepts or complex objects 
of perception. The product is called a concept, as 
man, biped, tree, science, etc. The characteristics 
of concepts are : 

1. Extension = The capacity of an idea to denote 
a number of individual wholes or apply to them 
equally. 

2. INTENSION = The capacity of an idea to connote 
one or more qualities forming an abstract group 
:'n all but singular terms, which are percepts. 



94 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

§ (2) Formation of Concepts. This represents the 
elements involved in the process of conception. 
They are two, and are closely connected with the 
determination of the intension and the extension 
of concepts. 

1 . Abstraction or Analysis. Abstraction is the 
act of neglecting certain qualities and of concen- 
trating attention upon others, so as to bring to- 
gether under a common notion all objects possess- 
ing the same attribute or a complement of the 
same attributes. Comparison is implied and gen- 
eralization is the result. The process is one which 
determines the extension of a concept, and there- 
fore the genus. 

2. Concretion or Synthesis. Concretion is the 
complement of abstraction, and is the act of com- 
prehending together the qualities expressed in a 
concept, or possessed by a class of objects, and 
takes account of both the common and the differ- 
ent properties. Discrimination is implied and 
specialization the result. The process determines 
the intension of a concept, and therefore the 
species. 

§ (3) The Forms of Concepts. There are two kinds 
of concepts according to the process of determin- 
ing the extension and intension. They are : 

1. Concrete. These denote attribute wholes which 
combine common and differential qualities, and 
are either pure (singulars) or mixed (species). 

2. Abstract. These denote attribute wholes which 
represent only the common quality or qualities in 
a class of objects, and are either pure (singulars) or 
mixed (genera). 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 95 

r Pure Proper names. Absolute. Plato. 
Concrete, j Mixe d = Specific terms. Relative. 

., f Mixed = Generic terms. Relative. 

Abstract. ~\ 
I Pure = Quality names. Absolute. Existence. 

§ (4) Denomination of Concepts. Denomination is 
the conventional or individual act of assigning a 
certain symbol, called language, to concepts for 
retaining permanent mental control over them. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 239-244; B. Ele., pp. 206-211; D., Psy., pp. 
204-213; Gordy, Lessons in Psychology, pp. 244-280; James, Psy., Vol. I., pp. 
459-483; Sully, H. M., pp. 4I3-433. 397-413; La dd, Psy., pp. 437~442; Hamil- 
ton, Lects. on Meta., Lects. XXXIV and XXXV; id., Lects. on Logic, Lects. 
VII-VIII. 

§ (5) Theories of Conception. The theories of con- 
ception have turned on the question whether ab- 
stract general concepts represent independent re- 
ality or not, Plato and the Platonists affirming that 
they do, and opponents denying it, and one school 
mediating between the two extremes. 

1. Realism. This theory affirms that abstract gen- 
eral concepts represent a reality or object of 
thought precisely as a percept is an object of cog- 
nition or a phenomenon an object of apprehension. 

2. Nominalism. This theory denies the reality of 
an object for universal or general ideas, and 
affirms that it is only the name that has a real 
existence, general concepts being a product or act 
of the mind.. Precursor of Idealism. 

3. CONCEPTUALISM. ' This theory compromises be- 
tween the other two by admitting that general 
ideas are modes of mental activity, but that the 
general qualities which are the objects of them 
exist as the properties of individual percepts, but 
have no independent existence. 



9 6 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



References. Murray, Psychology, pp. 202-208; Sully, H. M., Vol. II., p. 346; 
Ladd, Psy., pp. 442-445 ; Hamilton, Lects. on Meta., Lect. XXXV. 

VI. Judgment. Process and a product. As a product it 
is a proposition ; as a process it is the same act as percep- 
tion and conception, but differs from them in the subject 
matter to which it is applied: in perception the object or 
matter is presentations, in conception it is percepts, and in 
judgment it is concepts and percepts. 

§ (1) Definition of Judgment. Judgment is the act 
of mind which perceives a relation of agreement or 
disagreement between concepts, or between con- 
cepts and percepts. It is the perception of con- 
nection in some form, whether this be necessary or 
accidental. 
§ (2) Divisions of Judgment. There are two forms of 
division which are of interest to psychology, ac- 
cording as the distinction is between intension and 
extension, or between identity and difference of 
terms. They may be called the logical and the 
psychological forms. 

1. Logical Divisions. These represent proposi- 
tions in which the subject and predicate are con- 
nected with different relations of inclusion. 

{a) Intensive Judgments. These express the re- 
lation between substance and attribute, or 
subject and its properties, a qualitative relation 
in which the subject is conceived as including 
the predicate. 

(b) Extensive Judgments. These express the re- 
lation of genus and species, or of different 
species, a quantitative relation between classes 
in which the predicate includes the subject. 
Both classes can be converted into each other. 

2. Psychological Divisions. These represent 



5 YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



97 



propositions in which the subject and predicate 
are connected according to different relations of 
certitude. They conceive all propositions intens- 
ively. 

(a) Analytic Judgments. These are those in 
which the predicate is implied by the very 
conception of the subject, or is an analysis of 
it. Necessary. 

(b) Synthetic Judgments. These are those in 
which the predicate expresses more than the 
conception of the subject implies. Contingent. 

$ (3) Process and Implications of Judgment. The 
main difference between judgment and perception 
is that the latter stops with the cognition of fact, 
and the former extends to the necessity of certain 
relations. To determine the necessity of any con- 
nection between concepts requires that mental ac- 
tion in judgment proceed according to certain 
laws. The modes of action, or principles under 
which judgment proceeds, are : 

1 . The Law of Identity or Agreement. Simi- 
larity of objects and conceptions produces judg- 
ments of agreement, or the necessary connection 
in kind between those objects possessing essential 
resemblances. The connection conceived here is 
either metaphysical or mathematical, metaphysical 
if it is of substance and attribute, and mathemati- 
cal if it is of part and whole. This gives rise to 
the two kinds of judgment. 

2. The Law of Contradiction and Difference. 
Difference between objects and conceptions pro- 
duces judgments of exclusion, the negative of 
those of agreement. The connection is of the 
same kind as those of agreement, either metaphy- 
sical or mathematical. 



98 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Both, however, express a static relation between 
subject and predicate. 
3. The Law of Sufficient Reason. Phenomena 
have a reason or cause for their existence, and ac- 
cording to this law the mind determines the de- 
pendent connection between coexistent and 
sequent events. It is the judgment of necessary 
causal connection between phenomena by the 
principle that they can only be thought in that re- 
lation, if accounted for at all. 

The principle expresses a dynamic relation be- 
tween subject and predicate. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 211-216; D. Psy., pp. 213-218; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., 
pp. 434-457; Gordy, Lessons in Psychology, pp. 280-297; Murray, Handbook 
of Psychology, pp. 213-217. 

VII. Reasoning. As an act of mind reasoning is the 
same as that of perception, conception and judgment, but it 
may differ from them in the complexity of the subject mat- 
ter with which it deals. It determines a relation between 
given propositions and new ones suggested by them. 

§ (1) DEFINITION OF Reasoning. Reasoning is an in- 
ference or transition from one fact or proposition 
to another which is implied by it. The elements 
of the process are : 

1. ASSOCIATION, or the connection between present 
and past experiences. 

2. Perception, or the cognition of relation between 
terms, the act making explicit what is implicit in 
them. 

3. Judgment, or the determination of the quality of 
connection between the data and the inference. 

§ (2) Divisions of Reasoning. There are two gen- 
eral processes of reasoning according as the con- 
clusion is necessary ox problematic. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



99 



1. DEDUCTION. This is .reasoning from data which 
necessarily involve the conclusion drawn and which 
will not allow any alternative possibility. This 
may be analytic (Logic) and synthetic (Mathe- 
matics). 

2. Inductive. This is reasoning from data, which 
only problematically involves the conclusion 
drawn : that is, gives probable conclusions. This 
may be analytic (Generalization) and synthetic 
(Hypothesis). 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 351-370; B. Ele., pp. 216-221; D. Psy., pp. 220- 
231; Murray, Handbook of Psychology, pp. 217-226; Gordy, Lessons in Psy- 
chology, pp. 297-329; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 457-474- 

VIII. Knowledge, Doubt and Belief. Knowledge and 
belief express certain attitudes or convictions of conscious- 
ness in regard to propositions, but must be distinguished 
from each other on the ground of a difference of certitude 
between them. Both concern truth apart from beauty and 
goodness, and represent objects, conditions and processes of 
intellect, rather than emotions and will, but differ in respect 
to tenacity of conviction. Both have the same kind of ob- 
ject ; namely, truth. Doubt is incertitude. 

§ (1) Knowledge. Various meanings of the term, 
loose and technical. In general it is states of con- 
sciousness expressive of judgments which are quite 
indubitable to the subject of them. Sometimes a 
synonym for science, but always characterized by 
great certitude and cohesiveness. 
1. Definition. Knowledge is that form of intel- 
lectual assent to propositions which is character- 
ized by certitude, and by a source in personal 
experience and cognition. It therefore represents 
personal grounds for its character and tenacity. 



I0 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

2. DIVISIONS. Knowledge may be divided into two 
kinds, according to the method by which its cer- 
titude is established. 

(«) Cognition. This represents the direct appre- 
hension and perception of facts which compel 
assent by virtue of being a part of experience. 

(b) Ratio cinative. This is reasoned truth or con- 
viction produced or strengthened by deductive 
proof. 

The certitude, in this instance, of the pro- 
position comes from its implication in an 
accepted truth stated in the premises. 

3. Doctrines of Knowledge. There have been 
two theories in regard to the nature and con- 
ditions of knowledge, both of them having refer- 
ence to the degree of its certitude and to the 
question whether it expresses universal and ob- 
jective facts or not. 

(«) Theory of its Absoluteness. This doctrine 
asserts both that knowledge is the same for 
all rational beings, and that it has an ultimate 
source which is intuitive, and which represents 
certain principles conditioning the validity of 
particular truths. 

(b) Theory of its Relativity. This assumes two 
forms. The first is that all knowledge is sub- 
jective and relative to the subject of it, so that 
no two persons may be alike in their concep- 
tions ; and the second is that all knowledge is 
possible only through conditions which are, at 
least by implication, not known, but accepted 
on belief. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 243-265; D. Psy., pp. 218-220; McCosh, Defence 
of Fundamental Truth, pp. 231-251; id., Intuitions of the Mind, pp. 284-316, 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY IO i 

444; Philosophical Review, Vol. III., pp. 257-277; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 
383-501; Porter, The Human Intellect, pp. 51-80. 

§ (2) Belief. This conception has often been identified 
with faith, but in reality the two do not coincide. 
Faith may be a belief, but it is more at the same 
time. Their confusion comes from the fact that 
both may antecede knowledge, and have been 
taken to describe a source of conviction anterior 
to proof, owing to the controversies between 
reason and authority. Faith is trust in a person 
plus the acceptance of truth on the ground of that 
trust and the readiness to obey. Belief may be 
this acceptance on the same ground, but does not 
imply any disposition to subject the will to foreign 
guidance. 

1. Definition. Belief is that form of intellectual 
assent to propositions which provides only a prob- 
lematic allegiance to it, which accepts them on 
grounds not determined by personal experience or 
intuition, and which in the last analysis is the pro- 
duct of inductive reasoning and testimony. In 
other words, belief is assent to what is not proved. 

2. Divisions. There are two sources of belief which 
determine its kinds, according to the question 
whether it is received from without or the result 
of reasoning. 

(a) Testimonial Belief. This is belief as founded 
upon testimony and trust in a person. It 
assumes first the honesty of the testator, and 
second the absence of illusion and error on 
his part. 
, (b) Inductive Belief. This is belief as founded on 
inductive reasoning, and represents only what 
is probably true in various degrees, though 



102 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



the premises be indisputably true. It repre- 
sents a conception which has still to be veri- 
fied in order to become knowledge. 
3. Accidents of Belief. There are certain phe- 
nomena associated with the idea of belief which 
are often mistaken for its essential nature, but 
which are only accidents of certain forms of it, and 
are no part of it as a psychological process. They 
are : — 

(a) Antecedence to Knowledge. Belief is often said 
to be the condition of knowledge, and so is 
made synonymous with intuition or the source 
of axiomatic truth which conditions ratiocina- 
tive truth. But this is not always the case. 
Belief and intuition coincide only in not being 
ratiocinative, while one represents the accept- 
ance of truth on the positive and personal 
experience of it as a fact, and the other its 
acceptance on trust and before verification. 

(b) Relation to Emotion. Belief is often traced to 
interest or emotion as its cause, and as repre- 
senting its nature in opposition to knowledge. 
But this is wholly to evade or mistake its 
nature as assent or judgment, though only 
problematic, and to confuse the influence of 
emotion or interest in giving tenacity to belief, 
after it is formed, with the contents of it. In- 
terest undoubtedly determines persistency in 
holding beliefs, but not the creation of them. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 243-265; Sully, H. M., Vol. 1., pp. 483-501 ; Gordy, 
Lessons in Psychology, pp. 55-65; D., Psy., pp. 218-220; Philosophical Review, 
Vol. III., pp. 257-277. 

§ (3) DOUBT. Doubt is a state of mind equally opposed 
to knowledge and belief in its true conception. But 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



103 



in one conception of it the term denotes the same 
as a belief, though opposed to a particuiar con- 
tent of that act. 

1. Definition. Doubt is the suspense of judgment 
or conviction for the want of evidence. Hence it 
is a purely negative attitude of mind, which refuses 
to form an opinion one way or another in regard 
to propositions. 

Distinguished from disbelief, or " belief that 
not." 

2. CAUSES OF Doubt. The influences that produce 
doubt or the non-committal act of consciousness 
are various, but are summarized in the onexon- 
ception of non-experience, or the absence of per- 
sonal data for forming positive convictions. There 
are several forms of this cause. 

(a) Distrust of Testimony. This may be based 
upon the possibility of dishonesty in state- 
ment, or of error in observation. 

(&) The Existence of Illusions. The conscious- 
ness that illusions both of perception and of 
reasoning may occur, induces suspense of 
judgment regarding aught beyond the fact of 
experience. 

(c) Contradiction. A real or apparent contradic- 
tion between personal and communicated 
experiences, or between two personal experi- 
ences, gives rise to doubt until they are 
reconciled. 
References. B. Ele., pp. 254-257; Hamilton, Lects. on Meta., Lect. IV. 



CHAPTER IX 



EMOTION. 



I. Nature of Emotion. The phenomenon of emotion 
represents the second great division of mental states. It 
accompanies all others, but varies in degree of intensity and 
interest, so that it may appear to be a distinct function while 
it is in fact only one aspect of consciousness as a total. BiA 
as functions emotions are intermediate between cognition 
and volition as intelligent action. 

§ (i) Definition of Emotion. Compare Feeling, 
Sensibilities and Sentiment; also Impulse tnd 
Desire. A generic term to include the character- 
istics of consciousness which are consequent of 
function and antecedents of volition. 

Emotion is that aspect of consciousness which 
represents a subjective degree of excitement amend- 
ing the exercise of function or inciting to actiofi. In 
brief, it is the tone and spirit aspect of hentat 
states. The several characteristics which /define 

and determine it are : 

/ 

i. Subjective Feeling. It is the subjective; condi- 
tion or phase of the mind, pure and simple) in not 
being representative of objects, or correlated with 
them in any uniform way except perhap| in the 
individual. 

2. Concomitant of Presentation. Emoifon is in 
some degree an invariable accompanimipt of all 
(104) 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY IO ij 

presentation and action, but is not cognitive in 
nature. 
3. Intensity or Degree. Emotion is chiefly the 
intensity aspect of consciousness, represented in 
the variations of interest and excitement involved 
in different mental states. 

References. J. Br. C, p. 373; B. Ele., 222-224; D. Psy., pp. 246-249; H. 
Out., pp. 221-224; Murray, Hand-book of Psychology, p. 312; Sully, H. M., 
Vol. II., pp. 1-14; Hamilton, Lects on Meta., Lect. XLI, near the beginning; 
Spencer, Psy., Vol. I., pp. 272-291, 472-495. 

§ (2) Divisions of Emotion. Emotion is divided into 
two forms, according as it is an incident of func- 
tions in exercise, or an inciting influence to voli- 
tion. 

1 . Reflexive Emotion. This may be called Feel- 
ing and represents the reflex of function in exer- 
cise, the passive reaction of mind accompanying, 
and the complement of stimulus and cognition or 
apprehension. It comprehends every form and 
degree of pleasures and pains, or the agreeable 
and disagreable aspects of consciousness. It is es- 
sentially static in its nature in so far as it is without 
motive power. 

2. Impulsive Emotion. This may be called Pas- 
sion, and represents those excitements and ten- 
dencies which exercise a motor influence upon the 
muscular system, and are closely connected with 
the functions of the will. It comprehends every 
form of sympathy and antipathy toward objects. 
Its nature may be called dynamic or dynamogenic, 
in so far as it denotes motor tendencies. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 225; D. Psy., p. 249; Murray, Hand-book of Psycho- 
lo gy. PP- 337-349; Sully, H. M., Vol. II., pp. 46-47. 



1 06 *S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

II. Feeling, or Pleasure and Pain. This form of emo- 
tion, as already indicated, is characterized by being an ad- 
junct of every mental reaction upon external impressions and 
internal functional exercise, and serves more or less as a 
measure of the degree of adjustment to environment and the 
realization of personal instincts. Sometimes it is pleasure 
and sometimes pain. 

§ (1) Definition. While feeling may easily be denned 
as an adjunct of mental action, this fact does not 
express the peculiar characteristics which dis- 
tinguish pleasure from pain, and these qualities 
have been the chief interest of science. 

1. Historical Conception. Plato, Aristotle, 
Hamilton, Spencer. These center about the notion 
that pleasure and pain indicate healthy and un- 
healthy action. 

2. Pleasure. Pleasure is the reflex of natural func- 
tion and unsatisfied desire. This implies nothing 
about its healthiness. 

3. PAIN. Pain is the reflex of unnatural function 
and of unsatisfied desire, or of over-gratification. 

§ (2) DIVISIONS. The divisions of Feeling or Pleasure 
and Pain are determined by their relation to the 
kind of function exercised, or with which they are 
connected. 
T. SENSUOUS. These are the pleasures and pains 
accompanying the action of the senses. The 
particular senses have no special names for their 
special feelings. 

2. INTELLECTUAL. These are the pleasures and 
pains accompanying mental occupation, with the 
search for truth, and the evasion of error. Curi- 
osity, admiration, etc. 

3. Moral. These are the pleasures accompanying 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



107 



the contemplation and performance of conduct. 
Approbation, penitence, remorse, etc. 
4. RELIGIOUS. These are the pleasures and pains 
accompanying the attitude of the person toward 
a Supreme Being. Reverence, awe, etc. 
§ (3) Conditions of Pleasure and Pain. The defi- 
nition naturally determines these conditions or 
causes, which help to define the law of their 
occurrence. 
1. Pleasure. 2. Pain. 

{a) Adjustment. (a) Over-stimulus. 

(b) Health. (b ) Organic disturbance. 

(c) Moderation. (c) Defective nutrition. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 226-228, 231-233; Sully, H. M., Vol. II., pp. 14-22; 
Bain, Emotions, Chapter I.; Ladd, Psy., pp. 162-210; id., Out., pp. 381-399. 

§ (4) Incidents and Functions of Pleasure and 
Pain. Pleasure and pain sustain various relations 
to other mental phenomena, which distinguish 
them from such events and prepare a way for 
their theoretical explanation. 

1. Relation to Weber's Law. The increase in 
intensity of feeling seems not to coincide with 
that of the intensity of sensation. 

References. J. Br. C, p. 67; Ladd, Psy., pp. 193-200. 

2. Relation to their Adjuncts. The connection 
of pleasure and pain with their causes and objects 
is a complex one, and is more or less distinct 
from their classification. 

{a) Relativity. Pleasures and pains show a much 
more marked degree of relativity, or variation 
between individuals, than sensations and cog- 



1 08 S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

nitions. Hence the variations of taste and 
morals. 

References. Spencer, Principles of Ethics, Vol. I., pp. 174-185. 

(b) Complexity of ^Esthetic Emotion. Art 
in every form, Painting, Sculpture, Music and 
Poetry, represent a sensuous order of objects, 
though the emotions awakened by them may 
be either purely sensuous, or both sensuous 
and intellectual, moral and religious. The 
object, however, in art must always be sensu- 
ous with a symbolic meaning, if it influence 
any but sensuous emotion. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 293-298; D. Psy., pp. 309-325; Ladd, Out., pp. 395- 
399; id. Psy., pp. 569-577; Sully, H. M., Vol. II., pp. 133-154; Bain, Emotions, 
Chapter XIV. 

(c) Influence on Vitality. There is every 
reason to believe that, as mental states, pleas- 
ures increase, and pains decrease vitality. 

References. Spencer, Psychology, Vol. I., pp. 272-291; id. Principles of 
Ethics, Vol. I., pp. 75-102. 

(d) Criteria of Adjustment. Pleasures and 
pains are the determinants of value for con- 
sciousness, though only for present and quali- 
tative, not quantitative values. This is to say 
that they may be criteria of right action for 
the moment, but are not safe guides without 
the use of reason and the consideration of 
after effects. 

References. B. Ele. pp. 233-240; D. Psy., pp. 246-249, 262-274; Spencer, 
Psychology, Vol. I., pp. 272-29 1; id., Principles of Ethics, Vol. I., pp. 75-102. 

(e) Stimulus of Desire. As criteria of values, 
feelings of good and bad, pleasure incites de- 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



109 



sire and pain aversion, and thus the two inter- 
mediate between cognition and volition. 
§ (5) Physiological Theories of Pleasure and 
Pain. There are three theories regarding the 
neural source of pleasure and pain, somewhat af- 
fected, however, by the conception taken of them 
as mental phenomena. 

1. Specific Nerves and Centres. This theory, 
after the analogy of specific sensory nerves, sup- 
poses distinct nerves and brain centers for pleasure 
and pain. This view consists with the phenomena 
of analgesia. 

2. Specific Brain Centres and Irradiation. 
This theory supposes that sensory stimulus, after 
reaching a certain intensity, diffuses from sensory to 
pleasure and pain centres. This view consists 
with the relation of pleasure and pain to Weber's 
Law. 

3. General Function of the Brain. This theory 
supposes that pleasure and pain are connected 
with all centers, and thus with brain functions as a 
whole. This view consists with the generic con- 
ception of pleasure and pain as adjuncts of any 
mental state. 

References. J. Br. C, p. 67. 

III. Passion, or Impulsive Emotion. As defined, this 
form of emotion expresses that mental excitement which 
tends to result in some form of action by sheer force of an 
impulsive influence inhering in it. It is the adjunct of all 
unreflective action and represents the dynamic aspect of 
consciousness as such. 

§ ( 1 ) Characteristics of Impulsive Emotion. This 
phenomenon lies on the borderland of volition, 



HO S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

and is probably very complex and difficult of 
analysis. But it is always divided into two oppo- 
site kinds, according to the attractive or the repul- 
sive influence of the object, 
i. DYNAMOGENIC. The peculiar tendency of this 
class of emotions is to explode without delibera- 
tion into muscular action or expression. They 
represent the dynamic tendency or aspect of con- 
sciousness which exists in various degrees, and 
are specially apparent when intense. 
References. J. Br. C, pp. 370-372; B. Ele., pp. 38, 308. 

2. Reference to an Object. Impulsive emotions,, 
lying as they do on the borderland of will, have 
a more distinct reference to their object than to 
their subject, and may even be regarded as cither 
the inception or a form of desire, the difference 
being only one of definition. 
§ (2) General Divisions. These are two, which rep- 
resent also the main elements of the motive in- 
fluences on the will. 

1. AFFECTIONS. The affections are the regard had 
for an agreeable object, and combine pleasure 
with this regard, making the emotion an exceed- 
ingly complex one. It comprehends Love, Re- 
spect, Admiration, Sympathy, Hope, etc. 

2. Repulsions. These are a sense of revulsion 
against disagreeable objects, and combine a feel- 
ing of pain with it. Illustrations are Hate, Dis- 
respect, Disgust, Antipathy, Disappointment, Fear, 
Anger. 

§ (3) Action and Development of Impulsive Emo- 
tions. These qualities are determined by the 
complex conditions connected with the adjust- 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY IXI 

merit and development of the subject, and merge 
into the active and voluntary functions of the 
mind. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 373-391; B. Ele., pp. 266-278, 299-307; H. Out., 
pp. 233-242; D. Psy., pp. 326-346; Sully, H. M., Vol, II., pp. 88-121; Bain, 
Emotions, Chapters VI.-IX.; Ladd, Out., pp. 399-410; id., Psy., pp. 534-560; 
Wundt, Human and Animal Psychology, pp. 381-394. 



CHAPTER X . 
THE WILL OR CONATION. 

I. General Nature of the Will. The will represents in 
general that entire class of phenomena which begins in con- 
nection with impulsive emotions and terminates in volition 
and muscular action, though it sometimes denotes the nar- 
rower field of mere volition. 

§ (i) Definition of the Term. Will has several 
meanings in which are comprehended the generic 
and specific notions just mentioned. They are : 
i . The Power of Volition. This is merely an ex- 
ecutive function of consciousness capable of initiat- 
ing muscular movement. 

2. The Power of Choice and Volition. This 
conception extends the notion to include the con- 
scious selection between alternatives. 

3. The Teleological Functions of Conscious- 
ness. This conception includes the Desires, Pas- 
sions, and all Motive states tending to choice and 
volition. 

4. The Subject or Mind as Determining Events. 
This conception denotes not so much a power of 
mind, nor a class of phenomena, as the subject in 
a certain conscious relation, the source of volun- 

• tary as distinct from involuntary action. 

Compare with these the notion of " unconscious 
will." 

(112) 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



113 



References. D. Psy., p. 347; Ladd, Psy., pp. 609-612, 619; Sully, H. M., 
Vol. II., pp. 177, 327-329; Hamilton, Lects. on Meta., Lect. XI. 

§ (2) Elements of the Will. In analyzing the will it 
must be taken as denoting everything which is 
directly connected with the tendency of conscious- 
ness, to issue in choice and volition. These ele- 
ments will therefore include all that goes under the 
head of desires, which are often called the motives 
of the will, as if they were dfstinct from it in their 
nature, but can be so only upon the supposition 
that " will " shall be limited to volitioit. The ele- 
ments, therefore, are : 

1. Motive Functions. These in general are the 
mental states and capacities which have not only 
been called the antecedents, but also the deter- 
minants of choice and volition. They represent 
the whole field of desire. 

(«) Impulse, or the dynamic tendency of conscious- 
ness to act in response to environment with- 
out regard to reflection. 

(b) Instinct, or the organic tendency to uniformity 
of action without regard either to environment 
or to reflection. 

(V) Reason, or the tendency to reflect before ac- 
tion, or at least to utilize the results of previous 
reflection. 

2. Active Functions. These in general represent 
the deliberative and initiative acts of conscious- 
ness which determine the voluntary direction of 
selection and movement. They represent the field 
of will in the narrow sense. 

(a) Choice, or the selection between alternative 
objects of consciousness. 

(b) Volition, or the executive act of initiating 
muscular movement. 



1 1 4 S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

§ (3) Origin and Development of Actions. There 
are two sources of human actions which are dis- 
tinct from each other, and yet merge into each 
other in a way to confuse the distinction between 
them. One class of these actions is called volun- 
tary, and the other involuntary, the latter being 
the most highly developed at first, and the former 
most highly developed afterward, until they may 
appear in habits to be involuntary and mechanical 
again. 
1. Involuntary Actions. Involuntary actions are 
such as are not initiated consciously or with a 
purpose. They are properly muscular movements 
of an organic and unconscious character, and are 
of two kinds. 

(a) Reflex Actions. Reflex actions are uncon- 
scious responses to peripheral stimulus, which 
may be either extra-organic or intra-organic. 
Examples are beating of the heart, movement 
of the stomach, and in a less degree, winking 
and breathing. 

(b) Automatic Actions. Automatic actions are 
muscular movements which are initiated ap- 
parently without any stimulus, and so seem 
to be purely original to the organism. If 
stimulus occur at all, it is not co-ordinated 
with the action as in reflexes. Examples are 
twitching, convulsions, nervousness, primitive 
movements. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 92-95, 101-105, I 4°> B. Ele., pp. 39-44, 318-324; 
H. Out., pp. 308-312; D. Psy., p. 349; Ladd, Out., pp. 135-149; Sully, H. M., 
Vol. I., p. 46; Vol. II., pp. 182, 191,224-233; Bain, Senses and Intellect, Senses, 
Chapter I., pp. 57-72; The Will, Chapter I., pp. 303 310; Spencer, Prin. of Psy., 
Vol. I., pp. 427-432; Wundt, Human and Animal Psychology, pp. 120-133. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



115 



2. Characteristics of Reflex Actions. There 
are certain definite features about reflex actions 
which connect them with two worlds of facts at 
the same time. 

(a) Regularity . Reflex actions exhibit mechan- 
ical uniformity and dependence upon stimulus,, 
and being unconscious are generally identi- 
fied with physical movements. 

(b) Co-ordination. Reflex actions show an adjust- 
ment to ends which closely resembles teleo- 
logical movements, and are thus distinguished 
from purely mechanical movements. 

References. Human and Animal Psychology, pp. 1 26-128. 

3. Characteristics of Automatic Actions. Automatic 
actions are often identified with reflexes, but as 
here defined they are either distinct from them, or 
are such modifications of them as to be charac- 
terized by very different incidents. 

{a) Irregularity . Automatic actions are spas- 
modic and irregular, imitating spontaneous 
movements. 

(b) Non-co'rdination. Automatic actions do not 
exhibit the adaptation of reflexes, but may be 
wholly disjointed and abnormal. 

4. Voluntary Actions. Voluntary actions are 
those which are initiated by consciousness, and 
are usually limited to such as are clearly pur- 
posive. They are distinguished from all uncon- 
scious actions, and are often called ideo-motor. 
They coincide with volitions, and may be called 
teleological actions, in that they are conditioned by 
an idea of an end to be attained, and the desire to 
attain it. There are two stages of their develop- 
ment. 



j J 6 S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

(a) Spontaneous, or psycho-dynamic actions. These 
actions, which are non- reflective or non-delib- 
erative, and hence are impulsive in character, 
are largely the direct effect of whatever state 
of consciousness may be awakened. They 
begin in the actions of infants, which are either 
purely automatic or mixed automatic and 
spontaneous actions. 

(b) Reflective or psycho-deliberative actions. These 
actions are the result of deliberation either at 
the moment or previously, and imply a com- 
plete separation of external influences from 
the real determination of the will. They are 
properly rational actions. Psycho-dynamic 
actions are much like reflexes, and may be 
compared to them except that the latter are 
unconscious. Psycho-deliberative actions are 
wholly subjective in their causes, and are the 
highest development of voluntary actions. 

§^(4) Varieties of Voluntary Actions. The area 
represented by voluntary actions depends upon 
what we mean by actions, and what we mean by 
will. If actions refer only to the executive voli- 
tions, and if will be limited to the same field, then 
desire and choice are not voluntary, or in any 
sense phenomena of will. But in fact voluntary 
actions are all such determinations as are mental 
decisions with reference to an end, and may 
extend to other phenomena than the executive 
acts alone. 
1. Attention. Attention is the primitive act ol 
will, or the first element of it when it occurs, inas- 
much as it is selective and dynamogenic in its 
nature. It may be either impulsive or delibera- 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



117 



tive. Reflex attention is a misnomer, except as it 
expresses immediacy of attention as following 
stimulus. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 170, 224, 237, 450; B. Ele., pp. 71-74, 313-318, 
347-349, 361, 362; D. Psy., pp. 133-138; Sully, H. M., Vol. I., pp. 164-166, Vol. 
II., pp. 177-179; Ladd, Out., pp. 439-443; id. Psy., pp. 83-85, 213-216,366; 
Wundt, Human and Animal Psychology, pp, 252-258; Carpenter, Mental Physi- 
ology, pp. 132, 133, 386, 387. 

2. Desire. Desire differs from attention as an act 
of will only in being much more dependent for its 
incentives upon organic conditions. They would 
probably coincide always except for the fact that 
external impressions may create a greater varia- 
tion in attention than in desire. But the latter in- 
volves both attention and the direction of interest 
toward the object of the particular craving, and so 
far from being a motive of will, may be an act of 
will. It may be treated as a motive to volition. 

References. D. Psy., pp. 360-365; Ladd, Psy., pp. 601-603. 

3. Choice. Choice readily appears as an act of will, 
only it is subjective rather than objective. It is 
the decision of a conflict between alternative pos 
sibilities. It will be accompanied by both atten 
tion and desire, and may be either spontaneous or 
deliberative. It expresses the preference of the 
mind, and hence involves as much of the voluntary 
action of will as volition. 

References. J. Br. C, p. 170; B. Ele., p. 352; D., Psy., p. 365; Sully, H. M. f 
Vol. II., pp. 255-258. 

4. VOLITION. This expresses the executive fiat of 
the mind and the consequent motor action origi- 
nated by it. It is the phenomenon to which the 
function of will is often limited, but in reality is 



1 1 8 S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

only one form of active agency characterizing the 
mind in its capacity as will, the last act in the 
series of events which it determines and the me- 
dium of its physical effects. 
II. Motives and Desires. Motives and desires are often 
identified and often distinguished from each other. They 
shall here be treated as essentially the same. Both terms 
are ambiguous and require analysis. They express the 
mental states which precede and are generally supposed to 
determine choice and volition, which are distinguished from 
them, the desires being conceived as natural results and 
forces in the mental organism. Their true place and func- 
tion in psychical life "can be determined only by careful 
analysis and definition. 

§ (i) Definition of Desire. Desire, generically con- 
sidered, is a demand for satisfaction, a craving 
which either has reference to an object or is for an 
object which will supply a want. But this concep- 
tion comprehends two forms which represent very 
different relations to the will. 
i. Organic Appetites. These are constitutional 
cravings which are expressed in feelings that do 
not at first carry with them any conception of the 
object which will satisfy them, and hence seem to 
determine action without the intervention of the 
will. If they do so, they are purely psycho- 
dynamic acts which are excluded from the cate- 
gory of volitions. Desire, in this sense, is not a 
motive of volition, but merely a natural condition 
of the organism which produces muscular action 
of the reflex or automatic type, or becomes an ob- 
ject of reflective consciousness, and is related to 
volition through the latter. 
2. Conscious Appetites. These are cravings of 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



119 



whose object the mind is conscious. The same 
names apply to them generally as to the organic 
forms, but there is added the notion that the sub- 
ject is conscious of their meaning for its welfare. 
They are thus antecedents of volition, but affect it 
only through consciousness, and not by virtue of 
any necessary reflex influence. The will is first 
involved in making the feelings expressed by them 
an object of consciousness as a good, and then the 
will seeks to realize it. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 334-338; D., Psy., pp. 360-365, 350, 351, 388-39 1; 
H., Out., pp. 321-329; Ladd, Psy., pp. 601-608; Sully, H. M., Vol. II., pp. 180, 
196-21 1 ; Bain, Emotions, Chapter VIII. See also the principal works on Ethics, 
"viz., Martineau, Green, Stephen, Sidgwick, etc. 

§ (2) Characteristics of Desire. The nature and 
functions of desire depend wholly upon the ques- 
tion whether we are speaking of the conscious or 
the unconscious forms of it. The term should 
apply to only one class of phenomena, with a defi- 
nite content or meaning. But it applies to more 
than one in actual usage, and we must either take 
the common characteristics or distinguish between 
the two uses of the term in assigning its nature 
and functions. The latter is the better procedure. 
1. Elements of Organic Desire. The nature of 
organic desire is in general that of an event which 
is not willed, and which does not initiate a volition 
directly, if at all. Its elements are : 

(a) Subjective Feeling. This is that state of con- 
sciousness which only expresses want, and 
without experience indicates neither the cause 
nor the object of the want. Instance, original 
hunger, thirst, or other natural tendency. 

(b) Dynamic Influence. This is the impulsive ele- 



120 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ment of organic desire which tends to affect 
muscular tonicity and movement, but does not 
direct them consciously, and so does not 
motivate real volition. 

(c) Stimulus to Attention. The consciousness of 
want is so related to attention as to occasion 
it, and spontaneous reference to this want 
arises with the instinct or inclination to satisfy 
it. Primitive volition begins at this point. It 
is not choice in the deliberative, but only in 
the spontaneous sense. It closely resembles 
reflexes. 
2. Elements of Conscious Desire. This form of 

desire is superimposed upon organic desire and 

involves elements not contained in the merely 

organic craving. 

(a) Subjective Feeling. This is the same element 
as in organic desire. 

($) Dynamic Influence. This is less operative 
upon the muscular system than in organic 
desire. 

(c) Consciousness of the Object. In desire as a 
motive condition there is a direct knowledge 
of the object which will satisfy desire. 

(d) Attention. Every desire conscious of its ob- 
ject occupies attention sufficiently to include 
the primary act of will among its contents, 
and hence will not be a motive without con- 
sidering motives themselves as voluntary. 

(#) Choice. Selection has already occurred when 
we become conscious that the object is desir- 
able or is a good, though we may still wait for 
the fiat to produce volition. The most im- 
portant function of will is here included in 
desire. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY I2 i 

It thus appears that will is found in two 
elements of conscious desire, while that phe- 
nomenon is usually conceived as preceding 
the functions of choice and volition as a 
motive. It can be a motive to the will, in the 
old sense, only as it does not contain the will 
in itself. 
(3) Motives and their Nature. Motives and de- 
sires have often been identified, but the right to 
do this depends upon the conception taken of 
both of them. If both represent unconscious 
organic conditions, they may readily be identified, 
but if one be conscious and the other unconscious 
they cannot be the same. But the conception 
that they are both antecedents of volition has 
done much to identify them, while the conception 
of motive as purposive and of desire as organic 
and instinctive has done much to distinguish 
them. The meanings of the term motive must be 
examined. 

1. Meanings OF Motive. There are two current 
conceptions of this term which are wholly distinct 
in their associations and implications. 

(a) Mechanical "Motive!" This is any force 
which can initiate and sustain ' physical 
motion. It is in this conception wholly an 
unconscious fact and has no meaning for 
psychology. 

(b) Psychological Motive. This is the conscious 
purpose entertained by the mind in the act of 
choice and volition. 

2. Elements of Motives. Motives are complex 
data in the psychological conception of them. 
They are often conceived as merely causal events 



! 2 2 S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

determining volition, but this assumes that they 
are merely impulsive mental states, while in fact 
they are more than this. There are several ele- 
ments in every motive, which identifies them es- 
sentially with conscious desire, and involves char- 
acteristics of will. 

{a) Idea of an End. This is the intellectual ele- 
ment representing the reason for a choice or 
volition, and makes motives conscious facts. 
(b~) Impulsive Emotion. This is strictly the desire 
element, representing a craving for the object 
which will satisfy a want. 

(c) Attention. This is the inceptive act of will 
which diverts consciousness from other objects 
to the one represented in desire. 

(d) Choice. In every motive or desire (conscious) 
the object is chosen as a good, but there may 
be suspense in regard to the action which 
shall realize it. Hence everything but the ex- 
ecutive act of will is found in the motive. 

References. B. Ele., pp.338, 347-352,361-362; D., Psy., pp. 366-368; H., 
Out, pp. 325-329; Sully, H. M., Vol. II., pp. 208-215; Bain, The Will, Chapters 
V., VI.; Muirhead, Elements of Ethics, pp. 55-58; Caldervvood, Hand-book of 
Moral Philosophy, pp. 159-169. 

III. Choice and Volition: Choice and volition are the 
most important practical phenomena of will. They are 
usually spoken of as the only events directly connected with 
the will, and as perfectly distinct from desire. We have 
found choice, however, as a constituent of attention and de- 
sire. But it is not necessarily deliberative choice, which is 
what is usually meant by the term, and which is naturally a 
consequent of some particular desire as a natural demand 
for an object, and seems to be less dependent upon the in- 
fluence of external conditions. 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY ^3 

§ (1) Nature OF Choice. Choice is that act of mind 
which decides between two or more alternatives 
presented to consciousness at the same time. It 
is the internal act of will and does not necessarily 
issue immediately in a volition, but may suspend 
execution, while it also indicates a certain inde- 
pendence of the antecedent states, reckoned as 
motives or desires, by virtue of the fact that its own 
nature may constitute them as events of conscious- 
ness. There are, however, two forms of choice. 

1. Immediate Choice. This is the unreflective de- 
cision of the mind as soon as a stimulus or desire 
presents itself in consciousness and without wait- 
ing to know its connection with after effects. It 
presents the external appearance, at least, of be- 
ing determined by its antecedent events whether 
mental or extra-mental. The conditions under 
which it acts may be extra-voluntary. 

2. Deliberative Choice. This is choice after de- 
liberation or subject to it. It is therefore reflect- 
ive in its nature, which is simply to say that it is 
not a psycho-dynamic effect of the stimulus or 
state of consciousness which precedes it and which 
is its object. Deliberate choice involves a separa- 
tion or elimination of the mechanical or causal 
nexus between its own issue and the event which 
might have been taken as its condition if the 
choice had been immediate. 

\ (2) Elements of Deliberative Choice. Choice is a 
complex phenomenon and contains or implies the 
presence of several factors. Those elements are 
the same in all forms of it, except that delibera- 
tive choice contains one or two additional ele- 
ments not observable in immediate choice. 



12 a SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

1. A Desirable Object. Choice always has refer- 
ence to an object or end, and assumes the pres- 
ence of an idea which it is desirable to put into 
effect. 

2. Consciousness of Alternatives. Choice has 
no meaning except as it implies the presence of 
two or more alternatives from which the will must 
select one as its end, or as the means to a desired 
end. 

3. Inhibition of Impulse. This is some kind of 
restraint upon any tendency to immediate choice 
and volition, and breaks up the nexus between 
sensations or mental states and their dynamic 
consequences. 

4. Reflection or Deliberation. This is the act 
of mind or reason which endeavors to determine 
which alternative before consciousness is the right 
ideal, or the right means to that ideal. 

5. An Act of Judgment. This is the decision of 
the mind between the two alternatives, and affixes 
the mark of conformity upon the alternative 
which represents the ideal or desirable object, or 
the means to it. 

Referencez. B. Ele., pp. 347-361; D., Psy., pp. 365, 391-394, 407-41 1; H., 
Out., pp. 326-329; Sully, H. M., Vol. II., pp. 255-258; Bain, The Will, Chapters 
VII. and XL; Ladd, Psy., pp. 621-628. 

§ (3) The Nature of Volition. Compared with other 
mental acts volition is quite simple. It is simply 
the final act which gives effectiveness to choice, 
or which realizes the object of choice. Unless we 
make it cover every impulse or decision of the will 
from attention to choice, it will only denote the 
final initium or initiating force of physical move- 
ment which is the external result of will leading to 



S YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



125 



the realization of desire. In order to distinguish 
it from unconscious actions connected with the 
same organism, volition must involve or imply 
several facts. 

1. CONSCIOUSNESS. No act connected with any per- 
son can be a volition unless it be initiated by the 
subject, and accompanied by consciousness. 

2. Purpose or Intention. A volition must not 
only be caused by the subject, but must be con- 
nected with the consciousness of an end, or pur- 
pose. 

3. Executive Fiat. This is the distinctive feature 
of a volition, and denotes the exercise of causal 
agency in the initiation of movement. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 415-460; B. Ele., pp. 339-347; D -> Ps y-> PP- 359" 
.373; H., Out., pp. 317-320, 330-335; Spencer, Princ. of Psy., Vol. I., pp. 495- 
564; Sully, H. M., Vol. II., pp. 179-196; Ladd, Psy., pp. 613-621; Carpenter, 
Mental Physiology, pp. 376-384. 

III. Theories of Volition or of the Will. The theories 
of volition endeavor to explain how volitions originate, or to 
answer the question whether the will is free or not, whether 
man can choose and determine freely his actions. One 
school affirms and the other denies his freedom, but there 
are differences of conception both in regard to the notion of 
freedom and of the theories of volition, which make a defi- 
nition of terms necessary in all discussions of the problem. 
§ (1) Definition of Freedom. Whether the human 
will is free or not will depend wholly upon the 
conception we take of " freedom," and the relation 
of the will to the assumed conditions of its acts. 
There are several forms of freedom confused with 
each other under a common name, and they must 
be defined separately. 



I2 6 SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

1. LIBERTY = Exemption from external limitations 
which determine the alternatives for choice. 

2. Spontaneity = Sell-causation, or the causal activ- 
ity of the subject to produce what external circum- 
stances cannot produce. It is merely self initia- 
tive. 

3. VELLEITY = The power of alternative choice, or 
the capacity for acting otherwise than we do. 

The usual problem of freedom turns about the 
last conception, and hence it is to know whether 
man can choose equally between two alternative 
actions. 
§ (2) FORMS of THEORIES. The ordinary classification 
of theories is into two forms, Libertarianism or 
Freedomism, and Necessitarianism or Determinism. 
Sometimes a third theory, Indifferentism or Inde- 
terminism is added. Libertarianism affirms, Neces- 
sitarianism denies free choice and volition, and 
Indifferentism is a form of Libertarianism, though 
it connects free choice either with causeless or 
with motiveless volitions, or with indifference to 
all motives. Determinism is ambiguous, and in 
one conception favors Libertarianism. Hence the 
classification must be made with reference to the 
various points of view conceivable in the case. We 
first assume the dichotomous division. 
I. INDETERMINISM = The theory which holds that 
volitions are not mechanically determined, but 
originate in some way with their subject. Three 
forms : 

(a) Theory of Motiveless Volitions. This theory 
holds that free action must be motiveless as 
well as uncaused. 

(b) Theory of Causeless Volitions. This theory 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 12 J 

holds that volitions are not subject to the law 

of causation, though attended by motives. 
(c) Theory of Indifference to Motives. This theory 

holds that free actions must be indifferent to 

conflicting motives. 
2. Determinism = The theory which holds that all 
human actions are subject to the law of causation. 
But it divides into two forms according as the 
supposed cause is external or internal, and accord- 
ing as the actions are involuntary or voluntary. 

(a) Subjective Determinism. This theory holds 
that all choice and volition are caused by the 
subject of consciousness, and divides again 
into two forms, according as the possibility of 
alternative choice is affirmed or denied : uni- 
volism (unus, volo) or psychological necessi- 
tarianism, and multivolism (multus, volo) or 
psychological freedomism. 

(b) Objective Determinism. This theory holds 
that human actions are caused and necessi- 
tated by conditions and forces external to the 
subject of them. This is mechanical necessi- 
tarianism. 

References. B. Ele., pp. 362-367; H., Out., pp. 346-348; Murray Hand-book 
of Psychology, pp. 426-430; Hyslop, Elements of Ethics, pp. 152-165. 

§ (3) Relation of Facts to the Controversy. The 
universal abandonment of all forms of indetermin- 
ism, and the probability that mechanical necessi- 
tarianism is not seriously maintained by any one, 
though their arguments assume it, limit the con- 
troversy to the two forms of subjective determin- 
ism, and the solution of it will depend upon a 
right understanding of them and of the facts per- 
tinent to the problem. 



1 2 8 £ YLLAB US, OF PS YCHOL OGY 

i. Relation of Motives to the Will. Motives 
are invariable accompaniments and antecedents of 
what are usually called choice and voiition. 
Being ideas plus desire they are usually construed 
as the incentives or causes of conative events, de- 
terminants of will actions. But in so far as they 
are desires, promptings toward an end decided as 
a desideratum, they are already the preliminary or 
inceptive stages of will action. Desire is will, only 
it is uneffected will ; choice of a good, but not yet 
the adoption of means to realize it. Choice of 
the latter may be deliberative, the former may 
never be so. Hence the whole problem of will 
must be found in the nature of motives, its chief 
characteristic not being limited to choice of means 
and volition. The motives are of three kinds. 

(a) Impulsive Desire. This is a desire prompted 
by present stimulus, internal or external, and 
represents the tendency to obey momentary in- 
clinations, or to adjust action merely to pres- 
ent environment, itself constantly changing. 
Here the subject is "determined" largely by 
the accidents of impressions and suggestion. 

(b) InstinctiveD esire. This is an organic tendency 
to seek the same object constantly and with- 
out regard to momentary impulses or changes 
of environment, and implies more or less 
adjustment to fixed and uniform conditions. 
It represents dependence upon subjective, as 
impulse represents dependence upon objective 
conditions. 

(c) Rational Desire. This is conscious adjustment 
to conditions internal and external, accom- 
panied by calculation and deliberation, or the 



SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY I2 o, 

results of them. It represents the control of 
consciousness over the spasmodic and reflex 
action of impulse, and the unadaptive tenden- 
cies of instinct. It is therefore adjustment to 
both the constant and the variable elements 
of environment. It has two forms, prudential 
and moral desire, one determining interest and 
the other determining virtue, 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 415-4 60 ; B. Ele., PP- 3 2 4~33°. 33 2 ~338, 347"3^7; 
H., Out., pp. 313-330; Murray, Handbook of Psychology, pp. 410-418; Sully, H. 
M., Vol. II, pp. 208-216, 237-246; Ladd, Psy., pp. 230-233, 590-608; Bain, The 
Will, Chapter VIII. 

2. Distinction Between Choice of Ends and 
Choice of Means. The freedom of the will has 
generally been identified with the phenomenon of 
choice wherever found, but the difference between 
choosing the ultimate end, as expressed by desire, 
and the means to this end, is so great that it is pos- 
sible to maintain that the latter choice is free and 
the former is not. The consideration of this will 
have an important bearing upon the problem. 

3. Incidents Affecting the Problem. There are 
several facts and conceptions related to the ques- 
tion on one side or the other, whose force and 
relevancy, however, are determined by considera- 
tions involved in the various distinctions already 
indicated. They are: 

(a) Prevalence of the Strongest Motive. This con- 
ception assumes not only the causality of 
motives, but the analogy of their action to 
mechanical forces. 

(b) The Influence of Heredity. Heredity provides 
organic instincts and inclinations determining 
more or less the strongest motives. 



! 3 o s YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 

(c) The Limitations of Environment. External 
forces and agencies constantly exercise a ham- 
pering influence upon action, in that they limit 
the alternatives of choice consistent with per- 
sonal welfare. 

(d) The Fixity of Character. Volition seems 
always to accord with the character or nature 
of the subject. Character thus seems to de- 
termine the strongest motive and to conflict 
with the possibility of alternative choice. 

(e) The Effect of Deliberation. Reflection and de- 
liberation cut off the will from the reflex in- 
fluence of stimulus or external impressions 
and impulses, whether it interferes with the 
strongest motive or not. 

(f) The Consciousness of Freedom. It is usually 
admitted that we are conscious of being free, 
and those who defend free choice maintain 
the validity of this judgment, but the oppo- 
nents of it contend that, though we have such 
a feeling, it is an illusion. 

( S ) The Sense of Duty. The sense of duty is an 
imperative which commands that a certain 
course of action be pursued. It assumes that 
what ought to be done can be done, and as the 
obligation seems to imply that what ought to 
be done is not what habit and the nature of the 
subject represent, there is a conflict between 
what duty implies and what determinism as- 
serts from the fixity of character. Either, 
then, the sense of duty or psychological neces- 
sitarianism is an illusion. 

References. J. Br. C, pp. 415-460; B. Ele., pp. 363-372; D., Psy., pp. 359- 
417; H., Oil*-., pp. 321-348; Ladd, Out., pp. 430-444, id., Psy., pp. 615-643; 



5 YLLAB US OF PS YCHOL OGY 



131 



Sully, H. M., Vol. II, pp. 280-296; Wundt, Human and Animal Psychology, pp. 
423-436; Bain, The Will, Chapters VII. and XI.; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, 
Preface to the Fourth Edition; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Chapter V.; Philo- 
sophic Review, Vol. I., pp. 369-388, 292-298, Vol. II., pp. 529-543, Vol. III., pp. 
278-288, 385-411, 717-722. See also Indexes of Mind, The International Jour- 
nal of Ethics, and the Psychological Review. The literature on this subject is too 
plentiful to give more than a few elementary references. 



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